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Summary 
 
 
Since South Africa’s military intervention in the Angolan conflict twenty years ago, many 
scholars have written various conflicting accounts on the subject. Why did South Africa 
become involved in the first place, what made the SADF withdraw, and why did the country 
decide to become involved once again in a conflict that seemingly did not concern them? 
What happened at Cuito Cuanavale? These are the questions this study aims to address by 
drawing on the work of several influential authors. But why the differing narratives? Internal 
factors such as South Africa’s regional policies during apartheid as well as external factors 
such as pressure on the Nationalist government from the international arena, all played 
significant roles in the decision to become more deeply involved in Angola.  
 
South African regional policies during apartheid have been regarded in very different ways by 
various authors which this study will explore. SA’s policies during apartheid were 
characterised by anti-communism and influenced mainly by the thought that if SA supported 
a Western ideal, SA would be able to regain some international credit from Western powers. 
In addition, pressure from international actors increased on SA to protect the southern African 
region from communist domination. As a result, SA’s second intervention in Angola became 
prolonged as the clashes between the SADF/UNITA and Angolan/Cuban/Soviet forces grew 
in intensity. The battle/siege of Cuito Cuanavale is still considered to be the watershed 
moment that ended the Angolan conflict. The outcome of this battle, however, is still a very 
controversial subject to this day as some authors claim Cuba won, while others claim the 
SADF won. At the time there was no surrender. 
 
However, establishing exactly who the winner was is very difficult as every party to the 
conflict has its own ideas about what really happened. The military outcome and political 
consequences may have influenced this debate. For that reason it is imperative to remember 
all important influence that various schools of thoughts have on different observers and 
therefore accounts of the conflict as many of them were written in a time when Cold War and 
liberation sentiments thrived. Twenty years later is a good time for better informed hindsight. 
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Opsomming 
 
 
Sedert Suid-Afrika se militêre betrokkenheid in Angola twintig jaar gelede, het verskeie 
kontrasterende verhale van dié konflik die lig gesien. Hoekom het SA in die eerste plek 
betrokke geraak, waarom het die SAW die eerste keer onttrek en hoekom het die land besluit 
om weer ’n keer betrokke te raak by ’n konflik wat op die oog af niks met hulle te doen gehad 
het nie? Wat het by Cuito Cuanavale gebeur? Dit is die vrae wat hierdie studie sal probeer 
antwoord deur gebruik te maak van verskeie invloedryke outeurs. Maar hoekom die 
uiteenlopende stories? Interne faktore soos SA se streeksbeleide tesame met eksterne faktore 
soos internasionale druk op die NP regering, het almal deurslaggewende rolle gespeel in die 
besluit om dieper betrokke te raak in Angola.   
 
Suid-Afrikaanse streeksbeleide gedurende apartheid word anders geïnterpreteer deur 
verskillende outeurs afhangende uit watter oogpunt hulle skryf, hetsy liberaal of realisties. 
Streeksbeleide gedurende apartheid was gekenmerk deur anti-kommunistiese sentimente en is 
hoofsaaklik beïnvloed deur die denke dat indien SA hierdie Westerse ideaal ondersteun het, 
die land dalk ’n mate van sy reeds kwynende internasionale aansien sou herwin. Hoe dit ook 
al sy, die druk op SA om Suider Afrika te beskerm teen die kommunistiese aanslag, het 
geleidelik vergroot vanuit die internasionale arena. Dit is dan ook die rede waarom SA se 
tweede inval in Angola ‘n meesleurende en uitgerekte saga geword het aangesien botsings 
tussen die SAW/UNITA alliansie en die Angolese/Kubaanse/Russiese alliansies meer intens 
en op ’n meer gereelde basis voorgekom het. Die laaste offensief by Cuito Cuanavale word 
dus steeds gesien as die oomblik wat die einde van die Angolese oorlog ingelui het. Die 
uitkoms van hierdie geveg/beleg word egter steeds in kontroversie gehul aangesien daar 
steeds nie konsensus bereik kan word oor wie die eintlike wenners was nie. Sekere outeurs 
voer aan dat die Kubane sonder twyfel gewen het, terwyl ander beweer dat die SAW gewen 
het. Op daardie punt was daar egter geen militêre oorgawe nie. 
 
Juis om daardie rede is dit baie moeilik om vas te stel wie die eintlike wenner was, aangesien 
elke betrokke party sy eie idees gevorm het oor wat eintlik gebeur het. Dit is waarom dit 
belangrik is om te let op die invloed wat verskeie outeurs kan hê op dié onderwerp aangesien 
baie daarvan geskryf is gedurende ’n tyd toe die Koue Oorlog en bevrydingsoorloë aan die 
orde van die dag was. Twintig jare later is dalk ’n goeie tyd vir ’n terugblik. 
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Chapter 1 
1) Introduction 
1.1) Problem statement  
 
This study is about South Africa’s interventions in Angola, culminating in the battle/siege of 
Cuito Cuanavale in 1988. There is a political history about the build-up to this event. But 
because there were very few, if any, credible witnesses to this event, the narrative became 
extremely politicised. The meaning of the outcome is still contested today. 
 
On the one hand there was a school of thinking that claimed “the defeat of the South 
Africans”. They got in first, as early as 1989. A good example is an article by Horace 
Campbell (1989) with the same title. As far as can be ascertained he never visited the battle 
front, and based his assessment of what transpired from Havana and Luanda. This was an 
influential publication. In 1992, Hasu H Patel repeats this line of thinking in a publication of 
the Centre for Southern African Studies at the University of the Western Cape (“South 
Africa’s defeat at Cuito Cuanavale…”). The source of reference is Horace Campbell. Patel’s 
subtitle was “the frontline view”. 
 
On the other hand there were the earlier writings of Bridgeland (1990), Heitman (1990) and 
Chester Crocker (1992). The first two were military correspondents with ties to the SA 
Defence Force. They had access to files and military personnel. Their stories were different 
from the “frontline view” cited above. Their books were much better documented. Chester 
Crocker’s work had a different origin. He was President Ronald Reagan’s Secretary of State 
for Africa and used his own experience and sources for this book, essentially an 
autobiography. He writes of some Angolan and Cuban humiliations on the battlefield in late 
1987. However, the conventional wisdom at the time was shaped by the so-called “frontline 
view” which believed that because the SA Defence Force withdrew from Angola, and South 
Africa agreed on an American-driven but United Nations sanctioned peace plan for Namibia 
(UN Resolution 435), the South African military could only have been defeated at Cuito 
Cuanavale. This was also the official line from Fidel Castro and Havana. 
 
On the South African side, primary actors began to write. This included former SADF 
functionaries such as Jannie Geldenhuys (1993), Jan Breytenbach and Magnus Malan (2006). 
Their versions were remarkably similar to those of the military correspondents referred to 
earlier. According to them, the South Africans were far from being defeated. The plot 
thickened as many questions remained unanswered. This study will ask some questions about 
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the “what” and the “why” of 1988. This is twofold: what really happened at Cuito Cuanavale 
and why is there this discrepancy about the events of 1988, and its aftermath? To answer this, 
post-1988 outcomes are also relevant. However, for a better understanding of the South 
African interventions into Angola before 1988, an overview of events is required. 
 
The 1974 military coup in Lisbon set a train of events into motion on the Southern African 
subcontinent. When Portugal withdrew from Africa, the white cordon sanitaire crumbled. 
Barber and Barrett (1990) argue that South Africa feared political and security threats that 
might result from decolonisation in the region. South Africa faced immediate border problems 
(at that stage, the north of Namibia) as most of the movements that were coming to power 
were supported by the Soviets or the Chinese or the Cubans, all Communist states. They also 
argued that South Africa was in dire need of a barrier as SWAPO increased its penetration of 
Northern South West Africa. The reason this was important to SA, was the fact that SA had 
become more and more concerned about SA’s further isolation in the West because of 
apartheid, but also due to the ongoing dispute over Namibia. Increased international isolation 
of SA, made SA realise that they would be judged on internal policies as well as their policies 
towards neighbouring states.  
 
As the Namibian liberation movement SWAPO used bases in Angola it made more sense to 
try and stop SWAPO from inside SWA. At that time (1974), SA therefore decided to support 
UNITA, because it drew its support from the south of Angola and could aid SA in forming a 
buffer zone between Namibia and Angola. At first, Prime Minister Vorster was reluctant to 
increase this involvement. However, as the Cubans started to support the MPLA, South Africa 
was willing to escalate its intervention. But this intervention was a secret. Fred Bridgeland’s 
story (Bridgeland, 1990:11) in the Washington Post of 22 November 1975 was first to carry 
this scoop. According to this version (still denied by South Africa), the SADF advanced 
rapidly to the south of Luanda the capital. It was at that point that the Cubans were invited to 
assist. This apparently stopped the South African advance. 
 
There were, however, other motives as well. According to Barber & Barratt (1990), these 
were ensuring SA’s dominance in the Southern African region by turning Angola into a non-
hostile, cooperative state. 1975 also saw the adoption of the Clark amendment by the USA, 
which stated that no more aid were to be given to the nationalist movements in Angola, 
presumably the FNLA, which was supported by the USA up to that point. South Africa’s 
presence was frowned upon internationally. Having faced an unexpected Cuban defence, SA 
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felt betrayed and decided that troops would begin to withdraw. The Cubans claimed the South 
Africans were defeated. The Clark amendment was replaced, however, by the Reagan 
doctrine (which was sympathetic towards UNITA) only months later in June 1976. This 
suited South Africa as it was the governments’ viewpoint that SA would no longer fight alone 
on behalf of the free world. 
  
The period between 1984 and 1988 saw the emergence of regional tensions once again and 
SA’s regional policy became linked to domestic conflict and security concerns towards the 
ANC and SWAPO. With discreet American support Unita fought Angolan forces (Fapla). By 
1985 Unita was weakened, prompting the SADF to return to Angola. During 1987 Angolan 
and Cuban attacks on UNITA increased at Mavinga and the Lomba River and SA’s 
intervention was now deemed necessary to halt the Cuban/Russian offensives against UNITA. 
UNITA had been driven out of Huambo, and set up a new headquarters at Jamba, far to the 
east of Cuito Cuanavale and Mavinga. With UNITA almost destroyed in 1985 in areas to the 
west of Mavinga, SA believed that it would irrevocably lead to the destabilisation of the 
Southern African region (Barber & Barratt, 1990). However, FAPLA – the Angolan army, 
never succeeded in capturing UNITA’s headquarters at Jamba or ended its control over 
Mavinga. This is crucial to an understanding of the significance of Cuito Cuanavale as it was 
situated on the route to Mavinga and Jamba. To the west of these sites was Menongue which 
came under Cuban control after Unita lost Huambo. 
 
One has to keep in mind that the war in Angola became synonymous with Cold War rivalries 
and South Africa’s resistance towards the ANC. In other words, Angola’s anti-Portugal 
revolution (1960-1974) and the subsequent civil war became a proxy of the Cold War, which 
saw the United States, pitted against the communist Soviet Union and Cuba until the Cold 
War ended in 1989. Angola also became the place where the apartheid government clashed 
with SWAPO and the ANC (Hare, 2005). The entire Southern African region was thus seen 
as a region fighting against communist hegemony, while in truth there were numerous other 
reasons for each individual party’s involvement.  
 
It is in this context that the “what” of Cuito Cuanavale becomes relevant. As will become 
clearer later, the “Frontline View” (Patel’s characterisation) paid very little attention to battle 
front details (eg, troop deployments, tactical considerations, casualties, etc), but may have 
used the political outcome (eg, Namibian independence and South African withdrawal) as ex-
post facto an explanation of what was, for this school of thinking, the only logical outcome of 
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1988, namely South Africa’s defeat at Cuito Cuanavale. The “why” for this view, as well as 
explanations for the discrepancies about the outcome are much more ideological in nature. 
This is where perceptions and belief systems – even propaganda, also play roles. Chapter 2 
will encapsulate this narrative. 
 
At the so-called “war for Africa” in Angola (a term used by Bridgeland, 1990) Campbell 
(1990) believes that Angolans were not only defending their sovereignty but that they were 
also fighting for the self-determination of the African people. This was the “frontline view”. 
This view emphasised the Angolan role. But there is also Fidel Castro’s views which were 
quite critical of the Angolans who had suffered heavy defeats in 1975 and in late 1987, only 
for Castro to send in new troops that engaged the SADF in February 1988 for the first time 
since 1975 (Maier, 1996:26). 
 
Fidel Castro maintains that Cuito Cuanavale was an overwhelming victory for the Cubans. He 
states that “the withering advance by the powerful front of Cuban troops in south-western 
Angola, put an end to outside military aggression against the country. The enemy had to 
swallow its usual arrogant bullying and sit down at the negotiating table” (Ankomah, 
2008:10-17). But Minter (1994) argues that as South Africa’s principal objective was to keep 
the MPLA from coming to power, ironically it was perhaps the government’s decision to 
intervene militarily (in 1975) that made it possible for the MPLA with the support of Cuba to 
claim victories in the end. What is even more ironic is the fact that the two actors that South 
Africa wanted to destroy (SWAPO in South West Africa and the ANC in South Africa) 
eventually emerged as the two countries’ ruling political parties. Had negotiations with the 
ANC taken place and South West Africa’s independence been given earlier, we might have 
seen compromises and transitions taking place without a war in Angola. But this is conjecture. 
This study is about the longer-term political outcomes as well – the “why” of this research, 
and not necessarily the short-term military consequences – the “what”, only. It is therefore 
also about why the stories have so many versions. 
 
1.2) Objective and significance of study  
 
The objective of this study is to describe South Africa’s regional foreign policy that was 
adopted throughout the Southern African region during the first, and also the later, 
intervention in Angola in the 1970s and 1980s. In order to understand South Africa’s initial 
involvement, it is important to look at the important events that happened in the international 
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community: the Cold War, Soviet and Cuban threats in Southern Africa as well as what 
happened to SWAPO and the ANC in the region. This is described against the backdrop of 
apartheid in South Africa and the advance of liberation movements in the region.  
 
This study also aims at focusing on the difference of opinion that existed between SA’s 
decision to intervene during the 1970s and again the 1980s. The international community’s 
role again comes into play here. What were Cuba, the Soviet Union and even the USA’s 
actual motives to support the nationalist movements (in the American case, first the FNLA 
and then Unita) and why did attitudes change toward support for these movements throughout 
the conflict?  
 
During the last stages of the conflict (say, from 1985 onwards), several battles occurred 
between the SADF and/or Unita and the Angolan army and/or the Cubans always fighting 
with Soviet equipment. Before Cuito Cuanavale (1978-88), Unita suffered against Fapla, 
whilst Fapla suffered defeats against the SADF in 1987. What the exact outcome of this final 
battle was remains a much-contended topic to this day. Almost everybody claimed victory. 
But can one really claim victory (or defeat) in the absence of surrender?  
 
This study will try and answer the questions of “who won/lost/ defeated/withdrew” and “who 
settled on whose terms” by describing the events of twenty years ago as objectively as 
possible. Care must be taken of the disparate sources available which often have conflicting 
assessments of the outcomes. It is also to be expected that very few of the earlier sources were 
neutral – either siding with the SADF (such as Jannie Geldenhuy’s “Die wat gewen het”) or 
with the Cuban/Angolan side (such as Horace Campbell and Hasu Patel’s “frontline view”). 
The truth of what really happened may be implicit in all of these sources and finding the truth 
among a myriad of assessments is quite a challenge to post-conflict researchers.  
 
The significance of this study is, therefore, to hopefully shed some light on the “what” and 
“why” of this conflict. For some, the SA regime won the war on the battlefield but lost around 
the negotiation table. For others, the Cubans won in 1975 and defended their positions in 
1988. In such events, perceptions and even propaganda play significant roles. 
 
Another significance of this study is that distinctions will be made between the short-term 
military outcomes (eg the battle, siege, loss of equipment and casualties etc) and the longer-
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term political consequences for every party to the conflict. As the bigger picture was not at 
the disposal of researchers at the time when these events took place in southern Angola, these 
assessments lacked the benefits of hindsight. Now may be the best time to do this assessment. 
 
Despite the Campbell and Patel writings on the one hand and the Bridgeland, Heitman and 
Crocker writings on the other, very few neutral assessments came to the fore. Seven years 
later the story began to change with Karl Maier’s assessment of the confrontation (1996). Karl 
Maier was a journalist invited by Angolan government to observe the battle from the Angolan 
side in 1988. His assessments were more in line with Bridgeland (1990), Heitman (1990) and 
Crocker (1992), as they tell of the Fapla humiliations at the hands of the SADF at the Lomba 
River shortly before the battle of Cuito Cuanavale. The SADF then also attacked Menogue 
and Cuito in 1987 and early 1988. By then Castro committed more troops, especially to the 
defences inside the “Tumpo Triangle”. The SADF could not seize these positions. Then came 
the stalemate at Cuito Cuanavale. Years later, Dosman (2008) tells the same story.  
 
It was only until much later that scholars such as Breytenbach (1997), Scholtz (2006), 
Dosman  in Baines & Vale (2008) conducted more comprehensive research that had the 
benefit of hindsight. In this study the first point of departure is that Cuito Cuanavale has to be 
understood in terms of ideological considerations at the time when the adversaries took to the 
battle field. This is to say that it is important to remember the time frame during which this 
confrontation took place. This was the time of the Cold War as well as at the height of the 
liberation wars in Southern Africa. Apartheid was under heavy attack. For all parties, the 
propaganda value of discourse about the conflict, should not be underestimated. 
 
Then came the consequences of post-1988. Namibia became independent, Cuba withdrew 
from Angola, the Cold War ended, SA democratized and Jonas Savimbi was assassinated. 
The Angolan civil war only ended fourteen years later in 2002 long after South African 
withdrawal and Namibian independence. By that time the Soviet Union had collapsed and 
Washington normalized relations with Luanda. US companies became major beneficiaries of 
oil exploration in the Cabinda province of Angola. 
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1.3) Research methodology  
 
This study takes the form of a purely qualitative study as it makes use of secondary material 
to firstly describe and analyse the issue of South Africa’s regional policies towards its 
neighbouring states during the apartheid era. Secondary sources were reinterpreted as no 
empirical research was done. It uses existing materials, old and new, on how the confrontation 
unfolded. It tries to assess what had happened at Cuito Cuanavale and why the discrepancies 
about the event and its consequences.  
 
Academic sources such as realist, liberalist and neo-Marxist approaches were used for the 
sake of a better balance. Although no war veterans were interviewed for the purpose of this 
thesis, the accounts of certain role-players and even former actors (mostly close to the SADF 
like Magnus Malan, Jannie Geldenhuys and Jan Breytenbach) were used. Crocker, Maier, 
Bridgeland, Heitman and Steenkamp were used. These resources were invaluable. The New 
African’s version (April 2008) of Castro’s role in Africa was fascinating, but offered very 
little additional information. 
 
Finally, even though this study relies heavily on the use of secondary sources, the authenticity 
of research done on this topic since the end of the Angolan conflict, have been problematic 
due to the fact that South Africa initially denied that it was involved in the conflict. As 
implied above, the objectivity of sources is another problem that was encountered, as few if 
any of these observers or witnesses were present when the battle of Cuito Cuanavale took 
place. Cuban sources were published in Spanish, and generally not available in South Africa. 
Afrikaans sources (e.g. Jannie Geldenhuys’ first book) were not accessible overseas. 
However, with the passage of time more authoritative research had been published, together 
with autobiographies of actual roleplayers against which earlier rival claims and/or denials 
could be compared. In the end, the final assessment is ours. 
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Chapter 2 
 
2) South Africa’s Regional Policies During the 1970s and 1980s 
2.1) Protecting Western interests in sub-Saharan Africa 
South Africa’s regional policies seemed to have been mainly about tactics to protect white 
minority rule in Namibia and South Africa, while defending Western interests. During the 
1980s, however, these policies became increasingly linked to internal problems. By the late 
1970s, and P.W Botha as new Prime Minister, SA adopted a total strategy. Minter (1994) 
states that this total strategy was a framework of putting together a mix of reforms and 
repression in both the internal sphere and foreign policy. He states that after SA’s first 
intervention in Angola, the country possessed an enormous military edge over neighbouring 
states by the 1980s. The implication was that only the Soviets or the Cubans would have the 
capacity to stand up to the SADF. 
 
During the apartheid era, South Africa was deemed to be the most powerful military state in 
sub-Saharan Africa. This dominance was seen in view of the state’s capacity to mobilize and 
deploy armed forces as well as the manufacturing of arms. Due to international sanctions and 
an arms embargo, South Africa became the only state in this region that boasted an 
indigenous arms industry. In addition, the government and bureaucratic efficacy to “confront 
perceived external threats and domestic insurgency has been significantly enhanced by the 
painstaking construction of a sophisticated National Security Management System” 
(Baynham, 1990:403). South Africa’s security apparatus at that stage was founded on two 
major organizations, the South African Defence Force and the South African Police. Various 
factors were responsible for this situation. The first of these factors is the collapse of white-
ruled buffer states to the north of SA, especially in Angola and Mozambique in 1974/75 and 
Zimbabwe in 1980. The second factor was the increased international pressure for an arms 
embargo on SA. The third was due to the increased internal security dilemma’s following 
Sharpeville in 1960 and Soweto in 1976. The fourth was the escalation of violence and 
counter-insurgency in Namibia and Angola (Baynham, 1990:404). 
 
The growth of defence-orientated research and the rise of the country’s military-industrial 
complex served as evidence of SA’s ever expanding military establishment. It could therefore 
play regional roles if it wished to do so. Since 1977, SA became self-sufficient in the 
production of weapons, which became a top priority for the government. SA had also 
developed an uranium enrichment facility, which gave the country the potential to produce 
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nuclear weapons. According to Baynham (1990), the “evolution, expansion and 
rationalization of the national security apparatus in the 1970s and 1980s undoubtedly 
enhanced not only the public profile but also the political influence of the armed services” 
(Baynham, 1990:405-406).  
 
South Africa became a strong pariah (Geldenhuys, 1987). What made South Africa noticeably 
different from other pariah states of the time, such as Taiwan, Israel and Chile, is the fact that 
the country had a much larger and stronger segment of the population that favoured isolation. 
This isolation has made South Africa much more self-sufficient in the military area. Even 
though the South African local arms industry had reached a certain degree of sophistication 
during that time, the “manufacture of some vital modern armaments [still remained] beyond 
South Africa’s technological or financial capabilities” (Geldenhuys, 1987:35).  
 
For a long period of time the SA government publicly refused to admit to the obvious link 
that existed between the country’s internal policies and its external isolation. Now, as 
Geldenhuys stated in 1987, the SA government apparently accepted that the only way to stop 
isolation was to encourage domestic political change. The growing mood of white South 
Africans was, as could have been expected, very defiant. With increasing international 
pressure, white South Africans were also increasingly resistant to foreign interference, given 
the “dubious motives of many of the foreign advocates of sanctions” (Geldenhuys, 1987:36).  
 
According to Deon Geldenhuys (1989), during apartheid, white South Africans made no 
distinction between the struggle against this regime and an offensive against them as whites. 
As a result, white South Africans had the perception that a hostile external world in 
collaboration with the ANC seeks their destruction.  
 
But Booth and Vale (1995) argue, that even though this state had all this regional power, the 
country’s ruling elite felt increasingly insecure. The authors argue that this insecurity was not 
as a result of a shortage of material power, but that it was due to apartheid. In addition, SA’s 
ruling whites increasingly saw their country to be an ‘embattled bastion of Western 
civilization’ within the Cold War narrative, which is why security became such an important 
factor. For Booth and Vale (1995), it was this myth that shaped and encouraged views, which 
led to SA’s military to become the pivotal actor in policy-making during the 1980s. They also 
contended that it was these security myths that led to SA’s strategy of ‘destabilization’. This 
was a policy determined to pressurize and even punish those African states sympathetic to 
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SWAPO and the ANC. These became the main challenges of the remaining white ruled 
governments in Southern Africa. What happened in Angola became pivotal for the 
maintenance of the status quo in the region. For South Africa this conflict lasted from 1974 to 
1988. 
 
The international background against which the conflicts of this period is set, is one where the 
USA is considered the leader in the West and the Soviet Union the leader in the East. 
According to McGowan & Nel (2002) this was an era of ideological, economic, political and 
diplomatic confrontation between the USA and its allies on the one side and the USSR and its 
allies on the other. Jannie Geldenhuys (2007) also states that during the 1960s and 1970s it 
was very popular for superpowers to take sides and become involved in regional- and local 
conflicts. Superpowers then also attracted their allies to become involved.   
 
During the Cold War, Africa was of minor importance to the competing superpowers. But by 
the mid-1970s, the growth of the Soviet bloc’s influence in Africa had become a major threat 
to the West. The USSR’s influence in Africa grew due to the increasing number of 
independent states sympathetic to Moscow. Bipolarity meant that enemies were now directly 
engaged in all conflicts around the world.  The USA became directly involved in the defence 
of Western interests in Africa and battled Soviet influence in, among other regions, the Congo 
(McGowan & Nel, 2002:200-201). The USSR however, were more interested in an African 
country’s strategic importance than its socialist credentials, which meant that African states 
now had the power to play the superpowers off against one another.  
 
From the mid-1970s onwards, Africa was drawn directly into this bipolar military competition 
as both the USSR and China’s influence increased in strategically important regions. One of 
the areas where this conflict was most intense, was Southern Africa “where Western 
enthusiasm for political decolonisation stopped short of concerted efforts to bring democracy 
to countries under Portuguese colonial and white settler minority rule” (McGowan & Nel, 
2002:202). As McGowan and Nel state, the sustained occupation of Angola and Mozambique 
by Portugal was deemed as being a safeguard against nationalist attacks on white minority 
rule in South Africa. South Africa was in turn seen as offering protection to Western 
investments. However, as Soviet support for certain liberation movements intensified, South 
Africa transformed itself into a ‘bastion’ against communism. This was notably the case after 
Ethiopia ‘fell’ to the Soviet Union in 1977 and Britain and the US acquired conservative 
governments in 1979 and 1980 under Thatcher and Reagan respectively.  
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Rich (1992) states that the southern African region in particular has never been on the USA’s 
priority list until the advent of these strategic concerns. The increase in regional focus during 
the 1980s forced the USA to notice the role of the Frontline States in Southern Africa. The 
Frontline States was a ‘defense alliance’ driven by Tanzania and Zambia aimed at the ending 
of colonial and white rule in Portuguese territories as well as Rhodesia and South West 
Africa. In this context, South Africa was willing to defend the West. 
 
Due to the Soviet Union’s previous failures in post-colonial Africa, it was in dire need of a 
success story and Angola could possibly be the perfect opportunity (McGowan & Nel, 
2002:202). In 1975 however, resulting from pressure by the OAU and its chairman president 
Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Angola’s three nationalist leaders and Portugal signed the Alvor 
Agreement. This agreement recognised FNLA, the MPLA and UNITA as “the sole legitimate 
representatives of the people of Angola [and set] 11 November 1975 as independence day” 
(Barber & Barratt, 1990:187). This agreement, as well as another attempt at reconciliation, 
failed and the civil war erupted.  
 
The policy of  “constructive engagement” by the United States’ Reagan administration during 
the early 1980s emphasized the maintenance of economic links with SA in order to encourage 
the government to “move towards progressive internal political reform” (Rich, 1992:53).  For 
the USA, SA was still deemed as the bastion of anti-communism against the expansionist 
Soviet Union that was still interested in building on its influence it had already secured with 
the Marxist-inclined governments in Mozambique and Angola.  
 
2.2) The collapse of the white cordon sanitaire after 1974 
 
According to Sole (1994), South Africa’s foreign policy has traditionally been formulated by 
the country’s prime minister or president and the foreign minister. Parliament had no role in 
these foreign policy formulations and it was limited to a small number of individuals or elite. 
Occasionally, certain departments within the South African government such as defence and 
information “sought to conduct their own foreign policy independently of the foreign 
minister” (Sole, 1994:104). Sole argues that in each such case the consequences were 
disastrous. With the election success of D.F Malan’s National Party in 1948, the party’s 
primary objective was the consolidation and strengthening of Afrikaner dominance within the 
government. In order to achieve this, both domestic legislation and foreign policy 
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considerations were altered accordingly. The government’s greatest fear was that the 
Afrikaner population might become ‘swamped’ and therefore immigration was curtailed and 
South West Africa became a de facto part of SA (Sole, 1994:106). 
 
When Rhodesia declared its independence from Great Britain in 1965, Prime Minister 
Verwoerd decided that SA’s stance towards this would be entirely neutral and that normal 
relations with all the parties concerned would still be retained. Verwoerd argued “as South 
Africa was itself threatened by sanctions, it could not be a party to sanctions imposed by 
others on a third country” (Sole, 1994:109). In 1966 B.J Vorster became prime minister and 
several changes were made to the country’s foreign policy. One of the most significant policy 
changes was the assumption that SA’s future could no longer be detached from the rest of 
Africa. The new assumption under Vorster implied that the concept of SA being a bastion of 
Western Christian civilization that is separate and different from the rest of Africa, would be 
abandoned, although it was never publicly admitted. In its place, came the idea of ‘outward 
movement’ which was and “attempt to establish good relations with the neighbouring black 
states in Southern Africa, making use of Pretoria’s power and largesse to promote this 
relationship” (Sole, 1994:109). According to Sole (1994) these states consisted of an inner 
core, comprised of independent former High Commission Territories and the newly 
independent homelands. The outer core consisted of Malawi, Zambia, Rhodesia as well as 
Angola and Mozambique.  
 
Dialogue between these states and SA extended to the UN and also led to negotiations on the 
South West Africa issue. However, negotiations and the hope to reach agreements failed due 
to numerous factors. During this time there was an upsurge of Black Nationalism in South 
West Africa. The strength of guerrilla fighters in Zimbabwe was on the increase. SA also 
experienced the re-emergence of Black Nationalism and fears of Soviet penetration in Africa 
were rising. In 1974 the final blow came in the form of the revolution in Lisbon, which 
brought the end of the Portuguese colonial empire in Africa.  
 
SA’s own security was now under threat and foreign policy from 1974 onwards focused 
mainly on the survival of white SA (Sole, 1994:110). Sole states that amidst these 
occurrences, Vorster still sought to promote a policy of détente mainly against the Marxist 
regime that had taken over power in Mozambique. In addition he also collaborated with US 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in order to reach a settlement in Rhodesia. In principle, 
Vorster also accepted a constitutional conference in Geneva, which had as its goal Namibia’s 
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independence by 31 December 1978. This proposal however, was rejected by both SWAPO 
and the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance.  
 
One of the most important factors responsible in ruining these efforts was the situation in 
Angola and SA’s involvement therein. In 1975, then minister of defence P.W Botha 
pressurized the prime minister to send troops to Angola in aid of Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA 
movement. But SA’s armoured column “was halted 200 kilometres from Luanda and was 
forced to withdraw as a result of massive Cuban reinforcements and the termination of US 
support for UNITA” (Sole, 1994:110). From 1975 onwards, SA’s biggest concern was the 
possibility of Cuban forces crossing the border into Namibia and heading towards Windhoek 
in order to liberate the country from SA oppression. Sole argues that this was the moment that 
the concept of a ‘total onslaught’ began emerging and that the military now began to play a 
much more prominent role in determining foreign policy. The military’s position was 
strengthened by the Soweto riots in 1976 as well as the UN arms embargo against the country 
in 1977 (Sole, 1994:111) . 
 
Pacheco (1989) argues that with the fall of the Caetano regime in Portugal in 1974, SA was 
rid of both an ally and buffer when independence came for Mozambique and Angola. With 
these new states’ independence came two black-ruled states within close proximity of SA. At 
this time, SA was engaged in a détente initiative brought on by Prime Minister Vorster. This 
new diplomatic/political initiative’s objective was rather vaguely defined. According to 
Davies & O’Meara, the intention was to draw “the states of Southern Africa [into] a 
constellation of completely independent states which would form a strong bloc and present a 
united front against common enemies” (Davies & O’Meara, 1985:188).  
 
On 23 October 1974 Prime Minister Vorster delivered his benchmark speech to the Senate in 
which he stated that SA was standing at a crossroad in this point in time between peace on the 
one side and an escalation of discord on the other. He stated that there was an alternative to 
the oncoming chaos through the means of the “normalizing of relations, the way of sound 
understanding and normal association”. Three days later, on 26 October 1974, President 
Kaunda of Zambia was the first to react positively on the possibility of détente in Southern 
Africa. According to President Kaunda, a black victory in Rhodesia was inevitable. He also 
stated that there was no external threat to South African security and therefore there is no 
basis for the South African government to choose the option of conflict. The Prime Minister’s 
crossroads speech, President Kaunda’s positive reaction towards it, and Ian Smith’s 
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willingness to cooperate eventually made détente in Southern Africa possible. The détente 
initiative crumbled however due to the collapse of the joint South African-Zambian settlement 
initiative for Rhodesia as well as SA’s first intervention in Angola in 1975-76. In 1976 the 
Soweto riots also took place, refocusing international and African attention on South Africa’s 
internal policies.  
 
Pacheco (1989) states that there was little doubt that SA was facing a dramatic increase of 
conflict both internally and at its borders, which led to an intense program of weapons 
development. SA’s military ascendancy was underpinned firstly by what came to be known as 
‘a total strategy’ and then the well-known ‘Total National Strategy’ during Prime Minister 
P.W Botha’s time in office. Regional policies during this time underwent numerous 
restructurings. Firstly, Vorster’s vague notion of a constellation of states became substantially 
developed “and was now defined as the ultimate objective of regional strategy” (Davies & 
O’Meara, 1985:189). The urge to bring about such a constellation was now stronger than 
ever, due to the deteriorating situation for SA’s apartheid government as well as the country’s 
worsening relations with major Western Powers. As a result, SA deemed it necessary to 
generate a counter ideology to that of Marxism in the Southern African region. The SA 
Defence Force, rather than the Department of Foreign Affairs, became the major role-player 
in the foreign policy decision-making process, especially on Africa. This was initially not 
well coordinated. 
 
This lack of coordination was evident during SA’s first intervention in Angola in 1975-1976. 
Prior to the intervention, SA’s security mechanism was characterised by several ad hoc 
decisions, intense competition between the different security levels as well as disagreements 
among ministers about whether or not SA had to get involved beyond their border. This 
intervention took place in secrecy. A foreign journalist, Fred Bridgeland, scooped this news. 
After the Soweto uprising of 1976, increasing numbers of scholars and students joined the 
liberation struggle and it became apparent that SA had no other choice than to get involved in 
a long tiresome war against insurgents from across the border. Thus, the development of a 
national security plan was seen as a very important priority.  
 
In 1977 SA’s Department of Defence published a white paper, which stated that SA faced a 
total onslaught on practically every front, and that revolutionary threats could only be stopped 
by the adoption of a total strategy.  Due to the presence of Cuban troops and Soviet advisors 
in Angola, SA’s security situation in that region of Africa deteriorated rapidly.  
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During the 1960s and 1970s however, SA was a low priority to the Soviet Union and it only 
extended its influence into Africa when it didn’t hurt strategic goals at home. Angola became 
independent after the Portuguese withdrawal from Africa in 1974. Power was to be held by 
the former liberation movements, but by which one was uncertain. Hence, the Cold War 
rivalry as so who will get the power. The USSR and Cuba supported the MPLA with the USA 
and South Africa supporting the FNLA and UNITA. 
 
Pacheco (1989) states that by 1977, SA’s military objectives, policies and strategic doctrines 
were more readily defined than ever before. Military objectives were designed to include 
military and security arrangements with black homelands and neighbouring states under 
moderate leadership. These strategic doctrines would coincide with military policies and 
emphasis was put on defence posture, deterrence, counterinsurgency and assistance to civil 
authorities.  
 
But South Africa’s strategy of establishing a buffer zone ran into trouble due to the country’s 
disastrous first intervention in Angola in 1975-1976. Guelke (1980:657) argues that Angola 
specifically posed a serious problem to SA, as it was not economically dependent on SA, “yet 
it occupied a strategically important position on the border with South West Africa”. 
Evidently, SA was in need of a forthcoming government in Angola, as it would ease the 
transition problems in South West Africa.  
 
These interventions came either in the form of destabilization by the South African 
government or due to the Frontline States’ support for liberation movements. With the signing 
of the 1984 Nkomati Accord between SA and Mozambique, attention was immediately 
shifted towards SA’s regional policy objectives and strategies (Davies and O’Meara, 1985). 
This had regional as well as international implications. SA viewed linkages with its 
neighbours as the only way to break loose of international isolation.  
 
Davies and O’Meara (1985) argue that two major approaches described SA’s regional policies 
during the 1980s. The first one is that of “destabilizing” policies or the country’s 
“destabilizing strategies” towards the region. This approach contends that SA’s entire regional 
policy was based on the infliction of maximum material damage to regional states’ 
economies. This was seen as being a prelude to undermine the political system and eventually 
overthrowing their governments. According to the authors, this approach failed to recognize 
16 
 
that this strategy was designed to create networks of regional economic and social 
relationships with the neighbouring states since 1978. This was done in order to make these 
states realize that it would be in their best interests to collaborate with SA.  
 
The other approach discusses SA’s regional policies in terms of the conflicts that existed 
between the hawks within the government and the more diplomatic tactics that was favoured 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Flowing out of these two arguments is the view that the 
Nkomati Accord was a defeat for the militarists on the one hand, and a defeat for SA’s so-
called “destabilizing strategy” on the other. Although Davies and O’Meara (1985) also deem 
SA as being a very prominent and even an aggressor within the region since 1975, “the 
various military, economic and other disincentives commonly labelled ‘destabilization’, can 
in no sense be elevated to the status of either objectives or a strategy” (Davies & O’Meara, 
1985:184). The authors stress the fact that, together with other measures, these have to be 
viewed as specific tactical options within a much broader strategy. They argue that 
“destabilization” has never been a first option for SA, as the adoption of a particular tactic has 
depended on various factors. One of the most important factors has been the “rhythm of 
struggles at the regional level and the pattern of internal relations within the target state(s)” 
(Davies & O’Meara, 1985:185).  
 
Thus, as Davies and O’Meara (1985) argued, one of SA’s most enduring objectives with 
regards to their regional policies, has been to ensure that these subordinate countries continue 
to serve SA’s capitalism in this way. 
 
2.3) The Frontline States and South Africa’s total national strategy 
 
According to W.J. Breytenbach (1995) the two driving forces that led to the establishment of 
competing alliances in southern Africa, was colonialism and apartheid. The two sets of 
competing alliances where deemed a ‘black bloc’ and a ‘white bloc’. The ‘white bloc’ 
consisted of SA, Portugal and Rhodesia, which acted as allies in international relations prior 
to 1974. This bloc’s initiatives were however, regularly opposed by the UN, the OAU, the 
Non-Aligned Movement, the Commonwealth as well as individual states such as the USSR, 
mainland China, Cuba and India. The OAU had power over a Liberation Committee, but apart 
from this “the coordination of the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggles in the region 
lacked institutional capacity for the purposes needed by this ‘liberation alliance’” 
(Breytenbach, 1995:1).  
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The Frontline States’ struggle was protected by the OAU’s Dar es Salaam Declaration in 
1975. From that point on the frontline states were recognised as an ad-hoc committee of the 
OAU, which acted as a ‘defence alliance’ against external aggression. There was much 
rhetoric in both the white and black blocs, but the ‘white bloc’s’ actions went further as it 
found “its strongest normative expression in Prime Minister P.W Botha’s concept of a 
‘constellation of states’, as a part of his ‘total national strategy’” (Breytenbach, 1995:2).  
 
Breytenbach stated that the independence of Zimbabwe as well as the “success of the 
liberation movements in Zimbabwe’s first elections, [heralded] the high point in the history of 
the FLS” (Breytenbach, 1995:2). One outcome was that the independence of Namibia in 1990 
took place within the context of the war in Angola. On this matter, Namibia’s independence 
was settled by mechanisms in which the FLS played no major persuasive or activist role. In 
Angola, Vale (1991) argues SA used its custodianship over Namibia to support UNITA in a 
civil war against the MPLA government, which was supported by Cuba. In 1988 however, 
Vale argues that the balance of power on the subcontinent slipped out of SA’s military reach 
after the setback at the battle for Cuito Cuanavale. Due to Cuban air superiority and sounder 
military tactics, the SA troops eventually retreated while their general role in the region was 
beginning to be increasingly questioned back in SA.  
 
2.4) Angola – where it all came together 
 
Bender (1983) argues that with Angola’s independence in 1975, the right to self-
determination became one step closer to Namibia while it became increasingly unsure for 
South Africa. He states that the civil war that broke out immediately after independence was 
more than just an internal affair as it attracted extensive intervention from numerous sources 
during the Cold War, in addition to marking a decisive turning point in relations between the 
West and East. The newly independent Angola continued to be a “focus of East-West 
strategic manoeuvring and a vital link in the struggle for and negotiations over the 
independence of neighbouring Namibia” (Bender, 1983:4).  
 
During the Angolan civil war after 1974, the South African government needed control in 
strategic countries like South West Africa to neutralize the ANC, which had training camps in 
countries all over Southern Africa as well as to prevent the introduction of Communist 
regimes in Angola and Namibia. These training camps were the basis from which the ANC 
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trained their members to fight the Apartheid regime from outside the country with the help of 
Cuba, the Soviet Union, etc (Minter, 1994).  
 
SA’s strategy towards Angola incorporated attacks on SWAPO camps in southern Angola, 
assisting UNITA financially and logistically (as an alternative to the Soviet-supported 
MPLA), sabotaging economic targets and the bombing, invasion and occupation of strategic 
parts of southern Angola (Bender, 1983:10). Many scholars held the belief that a continued 
South African presence in Angola would have postponed Namibian independence as well as 
Angolan rapprochement.  
 
Even though the Cold War ended in 1989, the Angolan civil war lasted until Jonas Savimbi’s 
death in 2002. Namibia eventually gained independence in 1990, but it was the battle of Cuito 
Cuanavale in 1987/88 that proved to be the defining moment in the war in Angola. According 
to Barber & Barratt (1990), SA’s goal of turning Angola into a non-hostile , cooperative state 
had nothing but devastating effects on both the country and the region as such. As (Hare, 
2005) states, it resulted in Angola becoming the place where the apartheid government 
clashed with SWAPO and the ANC as the entire Southern African region was seen as fighting 
against communist hegemony.  
 
Baynham (1990) states that an important factor to remember is the fact that as SA rationalized 
the expansion of its national security apparatus during the 1970s and 1980s, so too did the 
political influence of the armed services. This period was also characterized by cleavages 
existing between the Department of Foreign Affairs and the SADF, but particularly the Army. 
Due to the fact that SA’s ruling whites increasingly saw their country to be an ‘embattled 
bastion of Western civilization’, security now became a major factor in determining foreign 
relations. This myth, as Booth & Vale (1995) state, is what shaped and encouraged views 
which led to SA’s military to become the pivotal actor in policy-making during the 1980s.  
 
That all came together in Angola: the near capture of Luanda by the SADF in 1975; the 
resistance of Cubans; the humiliation of Fapla forces by the SADF in 1987; the thwarted 
SADF attacks on Menogue and Cuito and the “Tumpo triangle” in 1988. Then the sudden 
withdrawal to the southwest at Kunene. 
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Chapter 3 
 
3) The South African Interventions in Angola 
3.1) The first intervention in 1975/76 
3.1.1) Cuba and South Africa: the first clashes 
SA’s first intervention of Angola seems to have resulted from the need to secure and protect 
its own interests. The government was severely anti-communist at this time, as the notion of 
the ‘total national strategy’ against the ‘total onslaught’ of communism became the all-
encompassing factor that determined foreign policy. SA’s détente politics toward Africa at 
this time was pursued rather successfully prior to the Angolan intervention in order to 
establish buffer zones, which would hopefully protect SA from the increasing communist 
threat. In addition, SA was becoming increasingly worried about this possible threat as the 
USSR and Cuba were enlarging their support to the MPLA after the coup in Portugal in 1974. 
The concentration of SWAPO insurgents on the southern Angola border furthermore 
endangered SA’s interests in SWA, as SWAPO was one of the MPLA’s biggest African 
allies. Both the MPLA and SWAPO were seen as Soviet proxies during the Cold War. 
South Africa was however, not the only African state concerned about the escalating 
communist threat in Angola. States such as Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Zambia and Zaire 
were all very much concerned that if the MPLA government came to power in Angola, it 
would endanger them as well. In addition, SA was pressured by some in the international 
community to get involved in Angola for the first time. The USA, like SA, was also strongly 
anti-communist and supported SA’s initial involvement to some extent. France also had 
concerns. SA also saw its limited initial involvement as an opportunity to establish a less 
hostile government in Angola, than what was already established in Mozambique. The FNLA, 
UNITA and several African and international actors such as Zaire and even Zambia made 
similar requests. South Africa decided that it would be in its own as well as the region’s best 
interest to intervene in the Angolan conflict.  
On 1 April 1973 the protection of the border area in northern SWA was taken over by the SA 
Army from a small anti-terrorist unit of the SA police. This arrangement came after 
increasing tension that was created due to SWAPO attacks on the Angolan/SWA border. 
Magnus Malan (2006) points out that after the coup in 1974, the three liberation movements 
in Angola had no aspiration of working together and that an interim government of national 
unity did not seem likely. South Africa thus became entangled in the political events of 
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Angola due to its geographic proximity and its mandate to defend over SWA. In January 
1975, after only a few months in office as the President of the new Portuguese Republic, 
General Antonio de Spinola was succeeded by Gen. Francisco da Costa Gomes, who arranged 
for the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA to meet with the Portuguese government in Alvor. This 
meeting’s goal was to sign an agreement which stipulated that these three liberation 
movements would be the only legal representatives of the Angolan people and that 
independence would be on 11 November 1975. The agreement also indicated that the 
Portuguese forces would begin to withdraw on 1 October 1975. The Alvor agreement hoped 
to put an end to the ongoing struggle between Portugal and these three Angolan factions, but 
in reality a civil war broke out and the interim coalition government fragmented (Malan, 
2006:111-112). 
Magnus Malan states that he himself knew that the SA government would have to do 
something at that time as instability at the border areas, as well as hostile attacks on the 
border, were increasing. He states that for foreign powers Angola became a very attractive 
area, due to its oilfields and diamond fields, in which to become involved in. The MPLA was 
supported by the USSR, Cuba as well as numerous other Eastern-bloc and communist 
countries, while at that stage the FNLA and UNITA received only sympathy and hardly any 
support from Western powers.  
There are still discrepancies about the exact time Cuba became involved in Angola, but Malan 
states that the Portuguese Admiral Antonio Rosa Coutinho met Castro in Havana in 1974 
during a secret mission to Cuba. During his visit to Castro it is reported that Coutinho 
encouraged Cuba to become involved in Angola and provide the MPLA with Cuban troops. 
This happened with “Operation Carlotta” in October 1975. The first clashes took place at the 
Kwanza River, south of Luanda, when 36 000 Cuban troops defended the MPLA. The 
American Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs seemed to have been of the same mind and 
stated that large-scale communist aid to Angola started in 1974 already. In February 1975 the 
first Russian personnel arrived in Angola, followed by Cuban forces in August of the same 
year (Malan, 2006:113), and then the first clashes in October. 
South Africa’s military involvement, therefore, as Magnus Malan states, followed Soviet-
Cuban involvement in the area. South Africa became involuntarily involved in Angolan 
matters due to increased tension on the SWA/Angolan border. This tension was due to the fact 
that some of the Angolan liberation movements tried to force Ovambos, living on either side 
of the border, in joining them and this led to SA’s interest at the Calueque dam, on the 
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Kunene River, becoming endangered. Angolans were increasingly harassing and intimidating 
Calueque workers, which made some of them flee their posts. They would only return to their 
posts if the SADF could guarantee their safety. The SA government realized that a crisis was 
approaching and therefore its decision to protect its interests at Calueque was in no way 
unexpected or unanticipated (Malan, 2006:114-115). 
However, as this hydroelectric scheme was a joint venture between SA and Portugal, Portugal 
requested that SA take over complete control of the mission to protect Calueque until they 
could do it themselves. Magnus Malan states that this take-over from the Portuguese never 
happened and that they informed SA that, due to its coming withdrawal from Angola on 11 
November 1975, Portugal could not contribute to protecting Calueque whatsoever. In the 
meantime, the MPLA’s communist support was expanding and the fear of a communist take-
over in Angola increased. The concern of anti-communist orientated African states, such as 
Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Zambia and Zaire, was increasing as well. Thus, in order to 
aid internal stability in Angola, SA made contact with UNITA and FNLA by means of the 
SADF and the Bureau for State Security (Malan, 2006:116-117). Then the first intervention 
and clashes with Cubans took place. 
According to Hallett (1978) SA’s first intervention into Angola in 1975-76 was tainted by 
vagueness, censorship and deliberate governmental denials. For the first time in its history, 
the South African army had to fight in an African war. Political discussions during the period 
between October 1975 and March 1976 were dominated by the debate about SA’s policy in 
Angola. Angola was of strategic importance to SA according to Hallet, as it possessed oil, 
diamonds, coffee plantations and other mineral and agricultural resources. For SA, a friendly 
and affluent Angola would be an advantage. In addition, and perhaps most important, was 
Angola’s border with South West Africa, SA’s most vulnerable domain. More specific 
reasons for SA’s interest in Angola were the engineering scheme established by the SA and 
Portuguese governments in order to harness the waters of the Cunene River. This engineering 
scheme would make it possible to greatly increase the “supply of electricity through the 
construction of a hydro-electric generating station” (Hallett, 1978:350).  
Apart from African countries, there were several ‘free world’ powers that were interested in 
putting checks on the MPLA. The USA seems an obvious actor, but France was by this time 
becoming more and more involved as well. France developed an interest in Cabinda and 
dispatched arms and mercenaries in aid of FNLA and UNITA. South Africa, which had 
suffered diplomatic isolation for some time by now, found itself in the unusual position “as 
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pursuing the same objectives as at least two…African states, the United States and France” 
(Hallett, 1978:363). But this alone does not suffice to explain SA’s final decision to intervene 
in Angola. The SA Nationalist government’s heavy stance against communism acts as one 
explanation. For SA, as for Cuba, the decision to become involved in the Angolan civil war 
was the result of a slowly escalating process. This transition of this process from one stage to 
another, which can become very difficult for an outsider to mark and date, include advisors 
being sent out to train combatants, advisors taking on a combat role themselves, the 
establishment of small specialized support units and eventually larger units of the regular 
army establishing a presence (Hallett, 1978:365). 
SA’s decision to become more deeply involved in Angola was thus not without risks as it ran 
counter to Vorster’s policy of détente, which was successfully pursued two years prior. 
Hallett states that SA’s first Angolan intervention passed through several stages between July 
and October 1975. First, SA pursued hot pursuit operations against SWAPO, which was 
followed by efforts to protect the hydro-electric scheme at Ruacana and Calueque. In 
September 1975 military advisors were dispatched, followed by armoured cars to assist 
UNITA. Then, in mid-October hot pursuit operations were reported again and “the decision 
was taken to launch a newly formed striking force” (Hallett, 1978:367-368). The SA 
government succeeded in preventing reports of involvement reaching the public by invoking 
the Defence Act, as was the case with the secret meetings between the Prime Minister and his 
closest confidants when the initial decision for deeper involvement were undertaken. In 
addition to the public being kept in the dark about this initial decision, so too was the Cabinet, 
Caucus and Parliament (Hallett, 1978:366-370). 
After the port city of Lobito came under SADF control, combat group ‘Zulu’ waited for four 
days “in anticipation of possible orders…to retreat” (Hallett, 1978:370). It appears as if SA’s 
initial plans were to withdraw their troops immediately after independence on 11 November, 
but according to reports Savimbi flew to Pretoria on 10 November 1975 to meet with Vorster 
and implored him to keep the South African troops in Angola until December. This was to be 
the date for the summit meeting of the OAU in Addis Ababa. According to Savimbi, 
moderate African leaders were all in favour of the anti-Soviet forces maintaining their 
presence in the field at least until a vote had been taken on Angola by the OAU at that 
meeting. This was in fact the case, as the liaison maintained between the Bureau of State 
Security and black African leaders “was producing appeals for the South Africans to hang on 
in Angola” (Hallett, 1978:370). In addition, the USA was also encouraging SA’s continued 
effort in Angola. 
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By late 1975, the SADF made great advances to the north of Angola and the MPLA came 
under huge pressure from both this advancement from the south as well as FNLA, which had 
occupied several positions to the north-east of Luanda. In November however, the MPLA 
received much needed aid in the form of very large numbers of Cuban soldiers. This was the 
Cuban “Operation Carlotta” of October 1975 when, first, 480 Cuban instructors arrived, 
followed by 36 000 troops (Ankomah, 2008:15). According to Maier (1996:16), Carlotta 
stopped Savannah, the SADF Operation at that time. It was also suggested that the reason for 
increased Soviet and Cuban aid was in response to the South African invasion (Hallett, 
1978:371). Some scholars however, would suggest the exact opposite. Media reports at that 
stage stated that if the SADF were to launch an attack on the capital city of Luanda, the war 
could be dragged out into a bloody siege. Savimbi too was aware of the dangers involving an 
attack on Luanda and reportedly had no desire to capture the city. Hallett, however, states that 
due to their previous successes and the fact that they were moving north without any 
obstruction, the SADF’s “temptation to strike for the capital seems to have been very great” 
(Hallett, 1978:372).  
According to Van Wyk, SA got involved in Angola with limited goals or intentions. The first 
intention was to protect the SA-Portuguese hydroelectric project at the Ruacana/Caleque dam, 
which provided water to the Ovambo region. The second intention was to aid FNLA and 
UNITA in preparing them to take power in an independent Angola. He states that SA’s goal 
was never to conquer or occupy Angola or even a part of the country. By November 1975 
France and the USA became fearful of the MPLA’s unilateral declaration of an independent 
Angola and therefore they both asked SA to ‘achieve success in Luanda’. This request by 
France and the USA made it look as if SA wanted to occupy Luanda. Consequently, France 
delivered arms and military vehicles in Kinshasa. The support from developed countries 
however dried up in January 1976 as French, British and Belgian governments requested that 
the international involvement in Angola to stop. As a result, US monetary aid came to an end 
and that together with the worldwide condemnation of the SADF led to the SADF turning 
around and withdrawing troops shortly before they were to reach Luanda (Van Wyk, 2008:26-
27). The question still lingers: were the SADF winning against the Cubans, stopped, or 
defeated? 
These assertions by Van Wyk and Hallett are problematical as the then Minister of Defence, 
P.W Botha, stated that the “South Africans could have gone on to Luanda, but that the US 
government had ‘pleaded’ with Pretoria not to do so” in his address to parliament on 
6 May 1976 (Hallett, 1978:372). According to the SA government, South Africa was not 
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willing to fight alone on behalf of the free world in order to eradicate communism from 
Southern Africa and Botha himself stated that he would like the free world to show more 
direct interest in this common goal. However, even though SA could not count on effective 
Western support at this stage, the Nationalist government was confident. It has to be noted too 
that the nature of the conflict in Angola was undergoing a rapid change as well. No longer 
could it be viewed as a bush war, as it was becoming “a sort of conventional war of rapidly 
moving vehicle columns, artillery and projectiles [which required] know-how, leadership and 
planning” (Hallett, 1978:373). This was needed on a level, which was not readily available 
among the black populations of Angola.  
FNLA’s leader Holden Roberto however, had an ambitious plan to attack Luanda on 9 
November 1975 and independently asked the SA government to help in achieving this. 
Magnus Malan states that even though the SA Army rejected this request, the government 
approved it. FNLA’s initial plan for attacking Luanda from the north showed many military 
errors as this position gave the attackers no cover from counter-attacks, while those defending 
Luanda would enjoy a much more covered area. The SA Army warned Roberto of this crucial 
miscalculation and offered to be of assistance, but all this came to no avail. As a result, the 
FAPLA/Cuban forces defeated FNLA convincingly in 1975. Then the SADF entered in a big 
way. This event made headlines and stated that the SADF was so close to Luanda that ‘they 
could see the city lights’, but that Pretoria had ordered them to withdraw. Magnus Malan 
wants to correct this statement and says that even though it is true that the forces that aided 
FNLA in the north were in fact very close to Luanda, this incident did not involve any of the 
other task forces from the south. Task force Zulu never had any orders to move that far north. 
Therefore the incident on 9 November 1975 should be viewed as an isolated incident and that 
it was never part of the SADF’s goals in Angola (Malan, 2006:127-129). 
Earlier in August 1975 it became apparent that the MPLA desired to rule Angola alone, as 
clashes between the MPLA’s military wing FAPLA and FNLA in Luanda intensified. The 
MPLA’s strategy was to control Angola’s ports and airports in order to cut off FNLA and 
UNITA from the outside world. States in central Africa, like Zambia and Zaire who relied 
heavily on the Benguela railway line that linked the port of Lobito to the Zambian copper 
belt, began fearing that the MPLA and SWAPO would obstruct goods being transported along 
this line and turned to SA in order to prevent this from happening (Malan, 2006:117). For SA 
to make any decision about military involvement in Angola, they had to take SWAPO’s 
attack from within Angola as well as the Cubans move south into consideration. FNLA and 
UNITA’s main requirements were that of weaponry and training the handling thereof. This 
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made SA become much deeper involved as aid was given by means of training, logistics as 
well as in the provision of key leadership fundamentals to the liberation movements (Malan, 
2006:118). 
However, as FAPLA and its Cuban supporters continued moving south, the possibility of a 
hostile state on the northern border of SWA looked very real. SA knew that if this were to 
happen SWAPO would gain immense support and momentum. It was at this stage, that Malan 
states that the USA urged SA to become involved in a anti-communist offensive in Angola.  
Zambia and Zaire supported this initiative, as they became increasingly aware of SA’s stance 
against communism and the danger this ideology held for Africa as a whole. It was expected 
by many that the OAU’s summit in December 1975 would deliver an acceptable solution to 
the Angolan situation. As no agreement could be reached on Angola at the summit, the 
SADF’s top leadership realized that something had to be done in order to stop the rapid 
communist threat. The SADF could however not take this decision alone and waited on the 
SA government to make the decision (Malan, 2006:119). 
What is Malan’s position? According to Magnus Malan, Operation Savannah was launched 
due to the following: firstly, the SADF intervened in Angola only to protect SA’s interests as 
increased external intervention in Angola have endangered those interests, secondly, the 
SADF had to support FNLA and UNITA in such a way as to not hamper SA’s détente-politics 
in any way. Malan, as the Head of the SA Army at that stage, was informed by the Head of 
the SADF that SA was in no way interested in territorial expansion at all. The SA Army’s task 
force Zulu entered Angola on 14 October 1975 and Operation Savannah officially began, then 
the clashes with Cuban troops took place. Malan makes it very clear and reiterates time and 
time again that this task force was not an occupying force, as it neither received any orders to 
occupy any part of the country nor to head to Luanda (Malan, 2006:121-123). 
Steenkamp (1989) however states that Operation Savannah was not, as many people thought 
at the time, a carefully planned military decision. At this time Prime Minister Vorster was 
heavily influenced by Lieutenant-General Hendrik van den Berg, Head of the Bureau for State 
Security, who tried to convince Vorster that deeper SADF involvement into Angola was not 
necessary. On the other end of the spectrum there was Defence Minister PW Botha, who was 
very supportive of a decision to deploy the SADF beyond the borders in order to contain the 
insurgency (Steenkamp, 1989:43). 
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Influenced by numerous international incidents that were taking place at the time, South 
Africa eventually decided to withdraw from Angola in late 1975. The USA was in the middle 
of dealing with the Watergate scandal. President Nixon’s credibility dwindled, as did 
American support for anti-communist countries and groups in Africa. With Nixon’s 
resignation, the US Senate adopted the Clark amendment on 19 December 1975, which 
stipulated that from 19 January 1976 no further covert aid would be supplied by the CIA to 
support FNLA and UNITA. With the end of US support, the international media began to 
criticize SA’s Angolan presence. Whether stopped by Operation Carlotta, or not, for Prime 
Minister Vorster, withdrawal was now the only option and the SA government agreed to stay 
on in Angola only until after the second OAU summit in Addis Ababa in January 1976 
(Malan, 2006:134), which endorsed the MPLA’s position. With this result, SA’s cabinet made 
a final decision to withdraw from Angola on 14 January 1976, with the exception of the 
Calueque-region. The USA was informed about SA’s decision and the OAU speedily 
recognized the MPLA as Angola’s legitimate government and the movement became a OAU 
member soon after. Needless to say, SA felt betrayed by the USA, as they were encouraged to 
get involved at first and later left in the lurch when they needed aid to tie up and conclude 
their Angolan intervention (Malan, 2006:135). Within three weeks of the South African 
withdrawal from Angola in 1976 all of central and southern Angola’s main towns fell to the 
Cuban and MPLA forces. The FNLA and Unita were thus quickly defeated. In March, 
Luanda informed and assured Pretoria that their interest at Ruacana/Caleueque were safe from 
any interference. Only now, with this assurance from Luanda was the SA government 
confident enough to order its troops to withdraw completely into South West African territory 
(Hallett, 1978:384). At that stage South Africa had much fewer troops in Angola than Cuba. 
 
On 27 March 1976, the SADF’s first convoys started to arrive at the Kunene River at 
Ruacana. Malan recalls how on that day he realized that the SADF and Armscor faced huge 
challenges in the future as SA’s weaponry and vehicles didn’t live up to expectations several 
times during Operation Savannah (Malan, 2006:136). With SA’s withdrawal from Angola, the 
MPLA and its allies speedily filled the vacuum by launching several attacks on the south. 
SWAPO now also benefited from this new situation as the communist aid that was now 
flowing into Angola, the MPLA would surely aid its South West African ally who was now in 
a much better position militarily than ever before (Malan, 2006:140-141). Operation 
Savannah did however buy FNLA and UNITA enough time to prepare for the renewed 
communist attacks, according to Malan. These renewed attacks took place during a 
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heightened communist era and if FAPLA/Cuba/the Soviet Union achieved success in Angola 
it would have benefited their campaign immensely (Malan, 2006:142). South Africa however, 
was still their main target as many government officials led the public to believe.  
However, Van Wyk states that SA underestimated the power of the neighboring countries’ 
liberation movements. During the early stages of Operation Savannah in 1975, the belief was 
that the liberation movements could be completely crushed with or without any aid from other 
actors. This however, was not the case as the war was dragged out for more than two decades, 
albeit with Cuban support. Thus, SA’s involvement escalated from only the provision of arms 
to military training of troops and own combat. Initially the troops trained by SA lagged 
behind those of the USSR and Cuba who were much better equipped and trained. It was only 
after the rest of the world decided not to sponsor SA with sufficient arms that SA decided to 
produce its own arms and weaponry (Van Wyk, 2008:28). 
Hallett (1978) states that even though they won most of their engagements against the Cubans 
in Angola, SA’s first intervention in 1975-1976 was indeed a failure. It failed to prevent an 
MPLA takeover. He goes on by saying that even if the South Africans did not intervene, the 
MPLA would still have received sufficient support in order to survive. He states that SA’s 
intervention led to a situation “in which the Cubans and the Russians were forced to build up 
a really massive presence” (Hallett, 1978:384). In addition, he states that SA also failed to 
stop the threat presented by SWAPO. During SA’s intervention SWAPO suffered from 
regular attacks by SA, but at the same time it now received much greater international support 
than before SA’s intervention.  
Although the “failure” was more political than military, the intervention did prove to be a 
psychological shock to SA’s white public, while it gave renewed hope and encouragement to 
the country’s black youth.  One can thus clearly see the parallels that existed between the 
Angolan intervention and the Soweto uprising in 1976. The Nationalist government cannot 
however, be accused of acting impulsively by deciding to intervene in Angola as it in part 
acted on the numerous external powers’ requests to get involved. The limited number of 
troops deployed into Angola also goes to show that it was never SA’s intention to occupy 
Angola. South Africa did however fail due to their assumption and strong belief in the 
commitment of Western powers. Kissinger’s failure to persuade the US Senate to continue the 
deliverance of aid to Angola, as well as the misjudgment of FNLA and UNITA’s strength all 
led to SA becoming unnecessarily deeper involved in the Angolan conflict (Hallett, 1978:385-
386). In time to come the Cubans would boast that they had won. 
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3.1.2) Unita and South Africa: the new alliance 
Both the MPLA and UNITA were regarded as being sympathetic towards SWAPO. FNLA 
however, did not seem interested in supporting SWAPO. SA had already begun to establish 
links with FNLA by July 1975. Much later however, ex-FNLA fighters formed the backbone 
of Col. Jan Breytenbach’s 32 Batallion. At the same time rifts started to appear within the 
transitional government, especially between FNLA and the MPLA who were at this time 
already receiving aid from opposite external actors. Hallett states that in reality, the liberation 
movements have been receiving outside aid for nearly a decade from the USSR and the USA. 
Even though this aid appeared to have been very modest and not without interruptions at first, 
the USSR supported the MPLA while the USA supported FNLA. Hallet suggested that the 
increase in Russian arm shipments to the MPLA in 1974 was in response to an increasing 
Chinese presence in the Third World. In January 1975 the USA provided the CIA with 
$300 000 which was to be covertly distributed to FNLA (Hallett, 1978:354-355). 
Increased FNLA activity now led to rumours in Luanda about the CIA’s increased support for 
the movement. The Clark Amendment was crucial. At the same time, FNLA troops aided by 
units of the Zairian army also began attacking MPLA units across the northern border. Deeper 
Russian involvement now came in the form of notable increases in the shipment of arms. 
Evidently, with the MPLA receiving considerable military support from the USSR, Cuba and 
Eastern Europe, and the USA’s decision to counter the Russian threat by supporting FNLA 
and UNITA together with the ever-increasing tension on the border of South West Africa and 
Angola becomes the background against which SA’s first Angolan intervention must be 
viewed. In February 1976 the SADF withdrew. Unita also suffered setbacks against 
FAPLA/Cuban forces. 
After the resistance offered by the Cubans in Operation Carlotta, and the Americans having 
passed the Clark Amendment in 1976, South Africa needed new allies for the war against 
Swapo and the MPLA. An alliance with Unita would suit South African and American 
interests under Ronald Reagan. By that time the war in Angola was, for most South Africans, 
a secret war. The government and the defence force communicated little, if anything, about 
the war. Foreign correspondents wrote what they knew. 
In such circumstances, big casualties would be disastrous from a public opinion perspective. 
Windrich (2008:195) writes that an alliance with Unita would keep losses to the SADF to a 
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minimum. During those times Unita was still a guerrilla force. But American and South 
African training and equipment turned it into a conventional army with tanks and missiles by 
1979. In central Angola, Unita did most of the fighting against FAPLA and the Cubans who 
got the upperhand. By 1985 it was beaten. Unita then retreated to Mavingo and Cuito 
Cuanavale while it established Jamba in southeast Angola as new headquarters. After 1976, 
South African forces concentrated on Swapo insurgents in northern Namibia, but with Unita 
under stress, South Africa came to its rescue after 1985. Hence the dual strategy of fighting 
Swapo on the ground while pursuing deeper cross-border operations into southern Angola. 
Unita and South Africa were once again allies. This culminated in Cuito Cuanavale in 1988. 
3.2) The second interventions since the late 1970s  
3.2.1) Operations in northern Namibia (1976-1985)  
According to Leopold Scholtz South Africa’s border war in northern Namibia became a 
household name from the sixties to late eighties as “hundreds of thousands of young white 
men were called up for military service” (Scholtz, 2006:19). They were told that they were 
fighting to keep the communist threat and SWAPO from spreading to Namibia as well as 
South Africa. The SADF applied the counter insurgency doctrines of J.J McCuen and Pop 
Fraser. These doctrines proposed five strategic principles of which the most important in the 
case of South Africa was to win the “hearts and minds” of the locals, and to get outside 
support. This principle suggested that SA had to obtain the “political and moral support of 
neighbouring states [which was] necessary [in order] to counter the external maneuvers of the 
revolutionaries” (Scholtz, 2006:24). Initially, South Africa did enjoy support from several 
African states, but its most important and significant support came in the form of the USA as 
a backer of Unita. As mentioned above, SA and Unita became allies once again. But Unita’s 
weaknesses against FAPLA with its outside support, forced SA to re-engage its adversaries on 
Angolan soil. Hence many more operations followed, many against SWAPO. 
After the coup of 24 April 1974, SWAPO moved its headquarters from Lusaka to Luanda. SA 
acted on requests to intervene by the USA, Zambia, the Ivory Coast and UNITA. This led to 
operation Savannah, opposed by the Cubans. When the US withdrew its support, SA decided 
to withdraw. The withdrawal now led to SWAPO switching its focus from the Caprivi to 
southern Angola and Ovamboland in 1976. The SADF quickly realized that it was in big 
trouble, as conscripts at that time were not as well trained as the guerrilla fighters. In addition, 
Major-General Constand Viljoen’s strategy of a “big sweeping operation to clear out SWAPO 
elements” failed as not one guerrilla was caught (Scholtz, 2006:30). 
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Swapo insurgency had begun 1966. From 1966 to 1977 the SADF’s “kill ratio” was only 4:1 
and by the end of 1977 the situation looked bad for the SADF indeed. In January 1976 Major–
General Jannie Geldenhuys became Head of the SADF. In his five-year command period 
several measures were implemented which turned the war into the SADF’s favour. Many 
black battalions were formed by the SADF, including Lieutenant-Colonel Jan Breytenbach’s 
32 Battallion (Scholtz, 2006:32). SWAPO’s rhetoric however, remained Marxist-Leninist and 
its goal was to convert Namibia into a Marxist one-party state. This, according to Scholtz 
(2006), was what enabled SA to present the conflict to the liberal outside world as that of a 
struggle between communist dictatorship and liberal multiparty democracy.   
After Operation Savannah from October 1975 to March 1976, several other Operations 
followed. According to Jannie Geldenhuys (2007), then the Head of the SADF, Operation 
Savannah was disrupted by Holden Roberto’s failed plan to attack Luanda. Others say the 
setback was Operation Carlotta. On 11 November 1975 Angola celebrated its independence 
“precisely ten years after Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of independence” (Geldenhuys, 
2007:43). The withdrawal of the SADF after this operation came after the US Senate adopted 
the Clark amendment. No more US aid would be provided to FNLA and UNITA and South 
Africa decided that they were not going to defend the West’s interests alone. Therefore, by the 
end of March 1976 the last of the SADF’s troops involved in Operation Savannah withdrew 
into SWA. Geldenhuys states that in hindsight it became clear that the picture in Angola 
might have been very different after this Operation had Roberto not decided to attack Luanda 
and the USA continued to provide support to FNLA and UNITA. Nothing is mentioned about 
the Cubans. Leopold Scholtz (2006) states that after the SADF’s withdrawal from Angola in 
1976, clandestine cross-border attacks on SWAPO bases in southern Angola commenced.  
On 27 March 1978 large-scale violence broke out after the assassination of Chief Clemens 
Kapuoo. He was chief of the Herero tribe, the chairman of the multi-racial Democratic 
Turnhalle Alliance and a SWAPO enemy. The SADF retaliated through Operation Reindeer, 
launched on May 4, “envisaged a drop by two hundred and fifty-seven paratroopers on the 
former iron-mining town of Cassinga…with simultaneous land attacks on targets around 
Chetequera and … confirmed and as suspected SWAPO bases some distance to the east of 
Chetequera” (Steenkamp, 1989:74). In June 1978 the SADF received intelligence that 
SWAPO was planning retaliation. They called their plan Operation Revenge and was 
planning to attack Katima Mulilo (Stiff, 2004:43). 
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The subsequent SADF attack on Cassinga led to widespread outcry as SWAPO alleged that 
the base housed seven hundred thousand innocent women and children. Recent research has 
however shown that even though the base did house refugees, the majority were in fact 
SWAPO cadres. The reason for the SADF attack on Cassinga was that they believed it to be 
the PLAN command headquarters. Brown states that even though it was true that PLAN’s 
commander and some troops were based there and the fact that it combined a military base 
with that of a refugee center, a SADF attack 250km into Angola seemed farfetched and 
unthinkable at the time. In answer to this event PLAN fighters who were based in Zambia 
“mortared and rocketed the Caprivian town of Katima Mulilo” (Brown, 1995:30). This was 
however, not the turning point of the war as the SADF scored big successes against SWAPO 
in years from 1980 to 1984.  The SADF launched several successive operations during this 
time. In addition to several smaller operations, Operations Sceptic and Klipkop (1980), Protea 
and Daisy (1981), Super and Meebos (1982) and Askari (1983-1984) were just some of the 
SADF’s well-known operations (Scholtz, 2006:37). 
In March 1979 Operation Rekstok/Saffraan was launched as one big operation taking place 
simultaneously in Angola (Rekstok) and Zambia (Saffraan). An attack on a SWAPO camp at 
Novo Catengue (Benguela) was carried out. In September of the same year the SADF bombed 
Lubango, which killed Angolan factory workers. In June 1980 Operation Sceptic/Smokeshell 
was launched. Some important incidents occurred in the run-up to this operation. In 
September 1979 the MPLA’s leader, Agostinho Neto, flew to Moscow where he died under, 
what was reported as, somewhat suspicious circumstances. In October 1979 after another 
round of negotiations the UN handed SA a newly revised plan for SWA’s independence, 
which included the concept of a Demilitarized Zone along the Angolan Border. However, as 
political incidents dragged on security occurrences continued (Geldenhuys, 2007:94). This 
operation involved a three-week raid against SWAPO bases at Chifufa, during which three 
hundred and sixty SWAPO and seventeen SADF members were killed. This was also the first 
time the SADF clashed with FAPLA forces (George, 2005:300-301). 
In July of the same year (1979) Operation Klipkop was launched and the SADF attacked a 
SWAPO base at Chitado (Cunene). It led to the death of twenty-seven SWAPO/FAPLA 
members (George, 2005:300-301). Operation Protea was launched in August 1981 and 
involved a full-scale invasion of Cunene. Geldenhuys (2007) states that this operation was the 
SA Army’s biggest mechanized operation since the end of the Second World War. The SADF 
had set up two garrisons at N’Giva and Xangongo. In clashes between the SADF and 
SWAPO/FAPLA one thousand of the latter group was killed, while only ten SADF members 
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were killed and many more wounded (George, 2005:300-301). Operation Protea proved to be 
the SADF’s largest external operation up to that time. This operation was “designed to gain 
military control of southern Angola and halt FAPLA’s ongoing logistical support for 
SWAPO” (Stiff, 2004:106). Its aims were to bomb the PLAN headquarters at Xangongo as 
well as to destroy the Angolans’ massive warfare equipment and heavy weapons at Ongiva 
(Steenkamp, 1989:98). In addition to defeating FAPLA on home soil during Operation Protea, 
this was also the first time that the SADF came face to face with Angolans interfering in their 
anti-SWAPO operations. At the time, the SADF’s main focus was SWAPO, while a 
rejuvenated Unita fought against the MPLA. 
August 1981 also saw the launch of Operation Carnation during which another two hundred 
and twenty five SWAPO members were killed (George, 2005:300-301). Operation Daisy was 
launched in November of the same year and the SADF attacks SWAPO bases at Bambi and 
Chetequera (Cunene). Operation Daisy proved to be the SADF’s deepest external raid since 
that of Operation Savannah (Steenkamp, 1989:99). According to Jannie Geldenhuys (2007) 
operations Protea and Carnation witnessed the second clash between FAPLA and the SADF 
as clashes intensified heavily by mid 1981. He ads that this was one of the SADF’s less 
successful operations as most of the enemy cadres already vacated their bases when the SADF 
reached them (Geldenhuys, 2007:120). 
In March 1982 SWAPO decided to follow a new infiltration route “running from south-
western Angola into the desolate and almost uninhabited Kaokoland area, then swinging 
eastwards into Ovamboland” (Steenkamp, 1989:101). Operation Super was launched after 
South African intelligence got wind of this new route. Operation Super involved an attack on 
a SWAPO assembly area near Iona (Namibe) and two hundred SWAPO members are killed. 
This operation was launched in response to reports that PLAN was ready to move to a new 
front in the Kaokoland region (Geldenhuys, 2007:115). In July and August of the same year 
the SADF launched several air and ground attacks on SWAPO command and control 
structures near Mupa (Cunene) during Operation Meebos. During these attacks on the 
enemies’ command systems, three hundred and fifty SWAPO members and twenty-nine 
SADF members were killed (George, 2005:300-301). 
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3.2.2) Cross-border operations in southern Angola (1983-1988) 
This phase preceded the “Battle for Africa” at Cuito Cuanavale. The main events of 1987/8 
will be described in Chapter 4. 
Despite huge losses during the early 1980s PLAN fighters waged wave after wave of 
insurgency and eventually succeeded in getting through to northern Namibia. After 1980 the 
scene also changed diplomatically with the election of a conservative government in the USA. 
Chester Crocker, the author of the constructive engagement policy argued in 1981 that the 
West should support UNITA “until such time that the MPLA is prepared to negotiate and 
expel the communist forces from Angola” (Brown, 1995:32-33). Consequently the term 
‘linkage’ came into being. Linkage referred to the linking of Cuban withdrawal from Angola 
with that of the withdrawal of SADF forces and the reaching of a Namibian settlement.  
In February 1983 Operation Phoenix was a two-month long operation in order to disrupt an 
infiltration of a one thousand seven hundred strong SWAPO column into Namibia. Apart 
from the two hundred and nine SWAPO and twenty-seven SADF deaths, thirty-three civilians 
were also killed (George, 2005:300-301). By the end of 1983 a full-scale invasion of Cunene, 
dubbed Operation Askari began. Jannie Geldenhuys (2007) states that it was clear by the end 
of 1983 that PLAN was planning a large-scale insurgency for early 1984. This operation’s 
main goal was to disrupt PLAN’s logistical infrastructure. One of the biggest alleged 
SADF/Cuban/ FAPLA clashes occurred when two Cuban battalions rushed to aid FAPLA in 
defending its headquarters at Cuvelai. It is uncertain, however, to what extent the Cubans 
were involved, as Maier claims that after 1975, Cubans only became directly involved in 
1987/8. 
According to Stiff (2004) it had become clear by late 1983 that the successes the SADF 
achieved during Operation Protea in 1981 to clear Xangongo and Ondjiva of SWAPO had 
become eroded. SWAPO now planned to move south from Cubango or Jamba, through 
Cassinga and then to Cuvelai from where they could infiltrate Namibia (Stiff, 2004:190). One 
of the SADF’s aims during Operation Askari was to occupy Cuvalai. After Cuvalai was 
captured by the SADF, they would be in control of the Cunene Province.  
Brown states that after 1978 the SADF nearly annually launched one large-scale external 
operation and that its dominance of the skies until the mid-1980s gave it a major advantage. 
Operation Sceptic involved air attacks and artillery bombardments, which lasted three weeks. 
Operation Protea proved to be the SADF’s most elaborate external operation as it attacked 
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and occupied PLAN bases around Ongiva. Operation Askari was launched on a much larger 
scale than previous operations and eventually resulted in talks between the MPLA and South 
African representatives. The Lusaka Accord which came out of these talks created the South 
African-Angolan Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC) “which in theory would monitor the 
removal of foreign troops (South African, Cuban and SWAPO) from most of southern 
Angola” (Brown, 1995:33-34).  
This Operation is deemed important as it led to the MPLA government to begin talks with SA 
as FAPLA and PLAN were involved in increased clashes. Accordingly, talks around the 
Lusaka Accord began in order to stop the hostilities and “keep SWAPO out of the border 
area” (Scholtz, 2006:38). The SADF now had a commanding lead over SWAPO militarily. 
Operation Askari changed the course of the war as PLAN was “reduced in military strength 
and from then onwards no longer posed a major threat” (Scholtz, 2006:38). The 1984 Lusaka 
Accord between SA and the MPLA did not include SWAPO as a member. Therefore SWAPO 
never considered itself bound by it and started moving south and infiltrating Ovamboland 
once again. Even so, SWAPO was losing the war with a “kill ratio” of 15,8:1. Operation 
Askari continued after the USSR informed SA “SA’s continued occupation of Angolan soil 
and support for UNITA was unacceptable to Moscow” (Steenkamp, 1989:112). Even though 
the Russians ensured SA that this was not meant as a threat, SA replied that the government 
saw this message in a very negative light. It was claimed that during this operation the SADF 
increasingly came into contact with aggressive Cuban/Fapla forces and not PLAN fighters. 
Steenkamp (1989) states that by this time it became clear that a major confrontation was 
indeed looming.  
In May 1985 the SADF raided SWAPO installations at Calombo (Cabinda) and two SADF 
members were captured. Operation Boswilger was launched in the same year and included a 
twenty-five mile sweep inside Angola over two weeks against SWAPO. This operation lasted 
only 48 hours as the SADF managed to follow the FAPLA cadres to their bases situated in 
three different areas in Angola. During the first day forty-three FAPLA members were killed 
and one was taken hostage after twenty-three contacts with the SADF. On the second day 
fourteen PLAN members were killed and four were captured after thirteen contacts. After this 
the SADF withdrew back to the border (Geldenhuys, 2007:128). By the mid 1980s the 
Angolan campaign was fought by mainly Unita forces along conventional lines against 
FAPLA forces with Cubans in the background. In September 1985 the MPLA launched its 
biggest offensive against UNITA. The goal was to occupy the area in southeastern Angola, 
which had been under UNITA control since the 1970s. At this time, Genl. Jannie Geldenhuys 
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took over as Head of the SADF from Genl. Constant Viljoen. In September 1985 Operations 
Magneto and Wallpaper were launched, during which the SADF provided UNITA with 
artillery advisors and medics (George, 2005:300-301). Unita then moved its headquarters to 
Jamba, while trying to occupy Mavinga and Cuito Cuanavale. 
The SA Navy Special Forces raided a Namibe harbour, destroying two fuel storage tanks, 
sinking the Habano and damaging two other Eastern bloc ships, in June 1986. Jannie 
Geldenhuys (2007) states that the brewing war clouds in the southern African region finally 
erupted on a massive scale in Angola between 1987 and 1988. This would give the process of 
negotiations over Cuban withdrawal from Angola and the implementation of Resolution 435 
in Namibia great momentum (Geldenhuys, 2007:161-162). The turning point in the Angolan 
war came in 1987-1988. In June 1987 the SADF provided UNITA with MRL’s and anti-tank 
teams to assist them in Operaçeo Chuva. On 4 August 1987 a 700-man force invaded Angola 
to support UNITA in defending Mavinga. This was the launching of Operation Modular. The 
SADF/UNITA forces clashed with FAPLA during the “Battle of the Lomba River” and 
successfully pushed back the FAPLA forces towards Cuito Cuanavale (George, 2005:300-
301). At this stage the Cubans re-entered the war as will be described in the next chapter. 
3.3) Evaluation: South Africa’s intentions 
Angola, unlike other African states, was not dependent on SA “yet occupied a strategically 
important position on the border with SWA” (Guelke, 1980:657). For some observers SA’s 
first intervention in Angola was an effort to establish a friendly government in Angola that 
would ease the transition in SWA. Nevertheless, the Soviet and Cuban support for the MPLA 
increased so rapidly and surpassed the South Africans expectations completely. Granted SA’s 
own interest were one of the main reasons for getting involved in Angola in 1975, one should 
not forget that international pressure also had a huge influence on this decision. The strong 
anti-communist stance of the West’s superpower, the USA, made South African involvement 
inevitable as it was prepared to support SA’s intervention regardless of the fact that SA’s 
domestic policies were seriously frowned upon internationally. This is not to say that SA 
would not have intervened in Angola were it not for the USA’s initial support, but that this 
support did make it reasonably easier for SA to justify its reasons for intervention.   
After withdrawing from the conflict in 1976, due to numerous factors such as the US Senate’s 
decision to stop aiding FNLA and UNITA as well as Operation Carlotta’s alleged success, 
and mounting international pressure on SA to withdraw, SA felt betrayed by the West. 
Operation Carlotta also signalled Cuba’s military intentions in the region. The security 
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situation however, could not be ignored and once again SA decided to become deeper 
involved in Angola – this time to stop SWAPO, in order to secure its interests. By the 1980s 
SA was dealing with international sanctions, while its justification for involvement, which 
was to protect SA from communism, were no longer deemed virtuous by the international 
community. Internationally SA’s domestic policy of apartheid, and the need to uphold it, was 
now deemed as the selfish reason for SA’s involvement. Even though the West and in 
particular the USA were still strongly anti-communist orientated, a conscience developed and 
they could no longer openly support a state with racist domestic policies such as SA.  
By the mid 1980s South Africa was totally isolated in diplomatic, political and economic 
terms. SA had no one to turn to for support and its interests in SWA’s northern border were 
coming under increased danger from SWAPO and its allies in Angola. The Soviet and Cuban 
forces in Angola were interfering in southern Africa on a large scale, by supporting the 
MPLA, in order to crush UNITA for once and for all. Jannie Geldenhuys (2007) stated that if 
the enemy succeeded in taking control of southern Angola the war would once again extend 
from Kaokoland in the west to the Caprivi in the east. Most importantly, Geldenhuys stated 
that if this was to happen, the effort that had been put in by SA as well as the lives that had 
been lost would all have been in vain and “the peace that South Africa had been trying to keep 
would become seriously threatened” (Geldenhuys, 2007:166-167).  
Furthermore, it was known at that time that MK camps were operating in northern Angola. 
South Africa feared that if the MPLA/Cuban forces were to take control of southeastern 
Angola, these MK camps would be moved into this area from where they would be in 
immediate contact with the neighbouring states of Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana. Access 
to these countries meant that insurgents had a direct route into SA (Geldenhuys, 2007:167). 
South African accounts about the reasons for SA’s involvement in Angola report nothing 
about the country’s interest in interfering in Angola due to its mineral resources, as can be 
expected. Be that as it may, according to these scholars SA only wanted to protect its borders 
from the communist threat and keep Windhoek under Pretoria’s control. 
At that time it was in fact true, and most scholars agree, that insurgency across the SWA 
borders were becoming a real threat for SA as well as other democratic and moderate African 
states. What was even more worrying for the SA Nationalist government however was that 
the policy of apartheid was coming under increased threat as well. The Nationalist 
government tried to keep the policy secure and in place for as long as possible, but the 
pressures for change from both inside and outside the country eventually became too strong. 
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This is not to say the reason for the SADF’s mission into Angola was exclusively to uphold 
and maintain the apartheid regime, but simply that one cannot ignore the fact that the 
Nationalist government greatly feared for the future of white minority rule, as it viewed SA to 
be one of the last bastions of Western ideals and beliefs in the southern African region.  
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Chapter 4 
 
4) The “Battle for Africa”: Cuito Cuanavale 
4.1) FAPLA’s failed annual attacks on Mavinga and Jamba 
 
Scholtz (1998:17) states that the battles fought by the SADF between September 1987 and 
July 1988 were some of the most intense battles ever fought since the Second World War in 
1945. This was the South African campaign in Angola against Angolan and Cuban forces, 
which led to a series of initial victories for the SADF on the banks of the Lomba River. This 
campaign he admits however, later ended in stalemate at Cuito Cuanavale where the SADF 
allegedly lost and was forced to negotiate, withdraw from Angola and grant Namibia its 
independence.   
 
One has to remember that since the battle took place the broader political situation had 
changed fundamentally as Namibia was now independent, Angola’s civil war had ended, the 
Cubans had left Angola, power in South Africa had changed through the means of a 
democratic election and the Cold War had ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall (Scholtz, 
1998:18). 
 
South Africa’s first intervention in Angola during the 1970s was primarily against SWAPO 
even though the SADF did encounter occasional and incidental contacts with FAPLA, 
especially when the SADF was close to capturing Luanda. The Cubans then intervened, and 
pushed the South Africans back. But they re-entered in 1976, joining with UNITA. 
Throughout the 1980s SA was slowly but surely once again becoming more and more 
involved in the civil war. In 1981, 1982 and 1983 FAPLA launched some badly organized 
offensives against UNITA in the southwest of Angola. The US, under Ronald Reagan, began 
to assist UNITA in 1981. Scholtz argues that each of these offensives lacked operational 
insight on the side of FAPLA as every attack usually followed the same predictable route. In 
the mid-eighties, UNITA relocated to Jamba. FAPLA then wanted to capture Jamba. Each 
time however, their offensive was successfully halted. In 1985 and 1986 FAPLA launched yet 
more attacks, but this time with increased troops and weaponry (Scholtz, 1998:21). These 
offensives were also successfully stopped by an SADF air raid on a FAPLA convoy at the 
Lomba River (Heitman, 1990:Ch 3-8, Bridgeland, 1990:71-83, Dosman, 2008:210). But more 
was to come, as the Cubans were to increase their pressure.  
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Before the Cubans re-entered in 1988, the SA Army’s Intelligence received information about 
a renewed FAPLA offensive. The SADF had become involved in Angola on the grounds of 
cross-border operations against SWAPO as well as limited involvement with UNITA in the 
delivering of weaponry and supplies. This time however, SA’s involvement would be very 
different and would lead to different outcomes. The SADF’s 1975-’76 campaign, twelve years 
earlier, was accompanied with negative political results, which made the SA government 
hesitant to become involved in Angola once again. During the 1980s the SADF’s cross-border 
operations were mainly targeted at SWAPO and any contact with FAPLA was to be avoided 
even though some skirmishes did occur. South African involvement had to be understood in 
terms of national interests, and that was that SA was not at war with Angola but with 
SWAPO. It’s most important interest was the assurance of UNITA’s future existence. For 
South Africa there were two interdependent factors that justified its involvement at that time. 
This was the Cuban presence in Angola and the possibility of a SWAPO government in 
Namibia by means of a military victory.   The Cuban presence in Angola had always been the 
biggest worrying factor for the SA and American governments as the US linked Namibian 
independence to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola (Crocker, 1992:449-464). 
 
 
4.2) South Africa and UNITA: Blocking the 1987 offensives at Tumpo and the Lomba 
River 
By July 1987 the SADF’s biggest concern was still SWAPO. During the early 1980s the 
SADF had successfully limited SWAPO’s insurgency to Ovambo in Namibia. At this time 
UNITA occupied southeastern Angola, which made SWAPO infiltration through this region 
more difficult. However, UNITA was less active in the region north of Ovambo and the threat 
of SWAPO using this route increased. Scholtz (1998) states that General Jannie Geldenhuys 
asserts that if the MPLA succeeded in occupying the south-east of Angola, the SADF’s war 
against PLAN would once again stretch over a vast area from the Cunene River in the west to 
the Mpalela Island in the east of the Caprivi. In such a case, SA’s successful results of the past 
fourteen years would become undone (Scholtz, 1998:27). Therefore, SA could neither afford 
an MPLA victory in the southeast of Angola nor lose UNITA as a military and political ally.  
To stop the MPLA’s advance from Menongue to Jamba via Mavinga, the MPLA had to 
secure Cuito Cuanavale first. The SADF dubbed this Operation Modular. FAPLA was 
stopped at the Lomba River in November 1987. Heitman agrees, “while there was little 
positive effect to be achieved by a decision to intervene in support of UNITA, the potential 
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outcome of not interfering, was so negative that it outweighed the risks of intervention” 
(Heitman, 1990:25).  
4.3) Cuito Cuanavale, 1987/88 
4.3.1) Its strategic significance 
 
Karl Maier, an independent journalist, stated that the incidents in and around the town of 
Cuito Cuanavale had been in the news since late November 1987 “after crack South African 
troops had smashed an offensive by the FAPLA army outside the UNITA-held town of 
Mavinga at the River Lomba” (Maier, 1996:25). The attack on Mavinga, in the hopes of 
capturing it, cost over $1 billion in Soviet weaponry and was part of an effort to eventually 
strike at UNITA’s headquarters at Jamba. Since capturing Mavinga in 1980 by the SADF and 
UNITA, the town had become crucial, as it was the point of delivery of South African 
supplies. To many of the Cuban officials in southern Africa, an attack on Jamba would be 
reckless. But the MPLA government still dreamt of wiping out UNITA since taking control in 
1975. As Maier states, it turned out the Cubans were right after all as government forces 
suffered thousands of casualties and lost “hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of 
equipment” as well as having to retreat with the SADF on their track.  
 
Savimbi still claimed victory for UNITA at this point as the South African government still 
denied that its army had in fact a very prominent role in the battle. This time however, 
Savimbi’s claim that UNITA as solely responsible for the victories against the FAPLA/Cuban 
forces coincided with the South African Defence Minister, Magnus Malan’s admission that 
SA was in fact intervening in Angola in order to “stop Russian expansion and to save UNITA 
from annihilation” (Maier, 1996:25). Maier states that by the middle of November 1987, the 
Angolans were in full retreat (from Mavinga) and the town of Cuito Cuanavale looked set to 
fall to the South Africans.  
 
With FAPLA’s 47th Brigade annihilated, President Dos Santos made a personal appeal to 
Castro for Cuban support in early January 1988 (Dosman, 2007:18). It was at this point that 
the Castro decided to step up his military aid to the Angolans and an extra 15 000 troops were 
dispatched. Cuban troops in Angola now stood at 40 000 in total. The extra 15 000 troops 
included the elite 50th Division which succeeded in 1975 to turn “back the South African 
invasion force…as it was closing in on Luanda on the eve of independence” (Maier, 1996:26). 
In February 1988, Cuban forces were deployed around Cuito Cuanavale and within two 
weeks, they would engage in battle with the SADF for the first time during the late eighties. 
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As Maier (1996:26) stated the Angolans were in full retreat by November 1987 and the town 
of Cuito Cuanavale looked set to fall to the South Africans. However, he continues by stating 
that taking the town of Cuito Cuanavale was never the South Africans intention. On February 
14th 1988 Cuban and South African forces clashed for the first time since 1975.  
 
The beginning of 1988 looked favourable for SA once again as the SADF succeeded in 
pushing back FAPLA from the Lomba River to Tumpo. Dosman (in Baines & Vale) states 
that the SADF received approval for four additional operations in 1988 to be carried out in the 
west. These would complete the FAPLA eviction in southern Angola, but they would also be 
a means to a broader military and political end for SA. For SA, a change in regime in Angola, 
“with UNITA replacing the MPLA, [would act] as a vital safeguard for its interests in 
southern Africa” (Baines & Vale, 2008:211).  
SA’s strategic goals however, changed dramatically after Castro stated that Cuba wanted to 
join the negotiating process with regard to Angola and Namibia. This was the first time since 
the start of the conflict that there appeared to be a possibility of Cuba’s withdrawal from 
Angola. Castro did not support the FAPLA offensive against UNITA and according to 
Chester Crocker the Cuban forces had played “a distinctly secondary role” in the attacks. By 
November it was fair to say that the Cubans had a lead role in neither the diplomacy nor the 
war” (Crocker, 1992:363-365).  
 
Fidel Castro admits that Angolan/FAPLA forces were convincingly defeated at the Lomba 
River as once again “the Angolans [did] not follow Cuba’s recommendations, and the 
offensive was hit hard by South Africa” (Ankomah, 2008:16). Even so, the SADF was 
informed that there were still large numbers of FAPLA troops deployed east of the Cuito 
River. In 2008 Castro stated that Cuba’s brilliant commanders along with the reassembling 
Angolan army “prepared a mortal trap for the powerful South African forces…a trap into 
which the racist army fell, and was overpowered” (Ankomah, 2008:16). According to Horace 
Campbell (1989) the SADF suffered a high casualty rate among white conscripts as they 
failed to take the town of Cuito Cuanavale. These statements, however, cannot be 
corroborated. 
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4.3.2) The siege at Cuito Cuanavale in March 1988 
 
Before South African and Cuban military engagement in February 1988 much had happened. 
By the end of September 1987 the SADF and UNITA had been involved in many clashes with 
FAPLA along the Lomba River. On 3 October 1987 FAPLA was crushed after several failed 
attacks along the same line of attack on the UNITA/SADF forces. Even Castro admits that 
Angolan/FAPLA forces were convincingly defeated at the Lomba River. The campaign’s 
goal, to stop FAPLA’s advance toward Mavinga, was reached with the withdrawal of FAPLA 
forces back towards the north of Angola. Even so, the SADF was informed that there was still 
large numbers of FAPLA troops deployed east of the Cuito River. The SADF now had no 
other choice but to go into offensive mode as P.W. Botha “made it clear that the defeat should 
be so crushing, that FAPLA would not be able to launch a new offensive in 1988” (Heitman, 
1990:72).  
 
The SADF 20 Brigade was however only an ad hoc arrangement and reinforcements were 
needed for this big offensive. The SADF had to wait for these reinforcements during which 
time FAPLA had time to recover. Once again political considerations affected the way in 
which the offensive was launched against FAPLA. Bridgeland (1990:292) states that many of 
the SADF officers were frustrated, as “they wanted to launch an attack from the west as early 
as November 1987. Even in December we could have attacked the Menongue-Cuito 
Cuanavale road in strength and cut all their logistics. The war would have been over”.  
 
The reason the SA government chose a different strategy was due to Castro’s apparent 
suggestion that Cuba also be included in the ongoing peace talks between the USA and the 
MPLA. In the meantime, Cuban diplomats also started talks with officials at the South 
African Embassy at the UN in New York. Their goal was, as Bridgeland (1990:228) states, 
“to explore the possibility of a negotiated settlement of the Angolan conflict”. South Africa 
gained optimism as this ‘linkage’ between the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and 
SA’s adherence to Resolution 435 had been the most important aim of the USA and SA for 
years. Therefore, the SA government decided that launching an attack from the west of the 
Cuito River could perhaps deter the Cubans from joining the peace talks. The SADF was thus 
ordered to position themselves east of the Cuito River in the hopes that FAPLA would retreat 
westwards over the river of its own accord (Scholtz, 1998:39).  
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It is clear to see that the SA government had encountered a dilemma as to which order was to 
be carried out by the SADF. Prior to Cuba’s apparent suggestions to let it join the peace talks, 
the order from Pretoria to the SADF had been to hit FAPLA so hard that a renewed offensive 
in 1988 would be impossible. After Cuba’s statement Pretoria apparently ordered the SADF 
not to hit FAPLA so hard so that it hinders the peace initiatives. This paradox in strategy led 
to the SADF and UNITA launching a series of frontal attacks on a withdrawing FAPLA force, 
but even though it did hurt FAPLA they would still retreat intact. At Tumpo, FAPLA was 
very well positioned and the SADF/UNITA forces found themselves launching no less than 
three attacks (Scholtz, 1998:41-42).  
 
Scholtz (1998:45) states that it is an open question whether an SADF attack from the west of 
the Cuito River would have completely destroyed the peace talks or not. Even so, Scholtz 
argues that the three failed attacks at Tumpo didn’t do much to enable the talks to produce 
some kind of peace either. FAPLA’s failures at Tumpo also made it possible for Castro to 
gloat about the SADF’s problems at Cuito Cuanavale later on. Nevertheless, Pretoria 
eventually approved a limited, clandestine operation by 32 Battalion to disrupt FAPLA’s 
advancing line between Menongue and Cuito Cuanavale, in which they allegedly succeeded. 
 
Scholtz (1998:28) states that General Jannie Geldenhuys affirms that there were limited goals 
with the launch of Operation Modular. The goals were to serve and protect SA’s interests but 
not to interfere with the civil war. The latter was purely incidental and Jannie Geldenhuys 
states that it was the SA government’s reasoning that it was in fact still an Angolan war. He 
admits that even though SA did have real interests in the conflict, it was the SADF’s duty to 
only assist UNITA. It was Savimbi’s war and the SADF was its ally, in other words the silent 
partner. For this reason SA kept its aid to UNITA limited and clandestine, as they did years 
prior.  
 
SA’s strategic goals however, changed dramatically after Castro stated that Cuba wanted to 
join the negotiating process with regard to Angola and Namibia. This was the first time since 
the start of the conflict that there appeared to be a possibility of Cuba’s withdrawal from 
Angola. Castro did not support the FAPLA offensive against UNITA and according to 
Chester Crocker (1992:363-365) the Cuban forces had played “a distinctly secondary role” in 
the attacks. He continues by stating that the government in Havana disagreed with the Soviet 
plan and had done little to advance it. By November it was fair to say – according to Crocker, 
that the Cubans had a lead role in neither the diplomacy nor the war.  
44 
 
 
The first new assault on Cuito Cuanavale by the SADF (Operation Hooper) began on the 
morning of 13 January 1988, but was broken off at ten in the evening just as the SADF was 
on the point of success while UNITA announced that it had successfully captured the town. 
The Cubans then entered (Operation XXXI Anniversary) and clashed with the SADF in 
February 1988. On 23 March 1988 the SADF launched yet another attack on Cuito Cuanavale 
from the same northern route as the previous attack. The objective was to defeat FAPLA on 
the east bank, occupy the Tumpo Triangle and blow up the Cuito Bridge once and for all. This 
operation, called Operation Packer, faced much stronger FAPLA defences than before and it 
turned out to be a failure for the SADF and UNITA. It was a rainy day, with low cloud which 
hampered the SADF. Cuban defences were better and supplies from Menongue came through 
(Dosman, 2007:223). 
 
According to Gleijeses (2007) Castro did not only intend to defend the town of Cuito 
Cuanavale by sending more troops and weapons to Angola, but that he wanted “to force the 
SADF out of Angola for once and for all”. With the aid of Cuban reinforcements Cuito 
Cuanavale did not fall to the SADF and in March 1988 the SADF launched one last major 
attack on the town. Gleijeses writes that even Colonel Jan Breytenbach stated “the South 
African assault was brought to a grinding and definite halt by the combined Cuban and 
Angolan forces” (Gleijeses, 2007). Even though most South African documents on this battle 
are still classified, Gleijeses states that the general perception is that the SADF gave ground. 
But Dosman (2007:223) is emphatic: By 16:00 on March 23rd 1988 Operation Packer was a 
failure. After the battle US intelligence clarified the SADF’s withdrawal by stating that “they 
were impressed by the suddenness and scale of the Cuban advance and [that] they believed a 
major battle involved serious risks” (Gleijeses, 2007).  
 
Campbell (1990:25) claimed that the Angolan/Cuban radar defences reinforced by the Cuban 
air force had “blunted the South African attempt to take Cuito Cuanavale”. Campbell states 
that the SADF was very confident that they could capture Cuito Cuanavale and that UNITA 
even released press releases stating that UNITA had in fact captured Cuito Cuanavale. The 
siege then ended, and the battle switched to the southwest of Angola.  
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4.4) The switch to southwest Angola in 1988 
 
After March 23rd, Cuba decided to switch to southwestern Angola. By April 1988 SWAPO’s 
activities had increased under the protection of southwestern moving Cuban forces. Magnus 
Malan (2006:290-295) stated that certain Cuban units had begun to interfere with the SADF’s 
cross-border operations against SWAPO in Angola and this eventually led to another 
SADF/Cuban clash fifty kilometers inside Angola. The South Africans were puzzled about 
this move by Cuba. On the one hand the SADF viewed this southwesterly march as an 
attempt to divide the SADF’s attention between the southeastern front at Cuito (despite the 
problems of Operation Packer) and this southwestern front. Defending both fronts at the same 
time would have led to reduced troops on both fronts. On the other hand this southwestern 
movement could have been initiated in order to mislead the SADF and further weaken their 
presence at Cuito, while launching a renewed attempt to capture Mavinga and Jamba. But that 
did not happen. With these two sites still under SADF/UNITA control, South Africa was still 
considered undefeated at Cuito Cuanavale, but maybe losing politically against Cuba. 
 
Intelligence received by the SADF led them to believe that the Cubans were indeed planning 
to move down all the way to the Namibian border and that a clash between Soviet/Cuban and 
SWAPO’s PLAN forces could occur via Calueque. After defeating FAPLA at the Lomba 
River in November 1987, but before the siege at Cuito Cuanavale, the SADF decided to 
withdraw from Angola but also decided that Calueque would still be protected. Malan 
(2006:298-299) stated that the Cubans were decisively beaten during every subsequent battle. 
However, evidence does exist that contradicts this. The peace negotiations were well on their 
way and Malan states that Cuba now too began to realize that the settlement over the 
Angola/Namibia dispute was beginning to gain momentum. Cuba however, wanted one last 
chance to take revenge for the losses they had suffered on 26 June 1988 at Techipa. As a 
result the Cubans attacked the Calueque dam on 27 June 1988 by means of an air raid. Peace 
talks then became “serious and positive” (Dosman, 2007:224). South Africa thought it had 
won. Crocker (1992:360-372) also claimed South Africa won. But what did Castro say? 
 
According to Castro, the battle of Cuito Cuanavale was the “last offensive against Savimbi’s 
imaginary capital …in southeast Angola” (Ankomah, 2008:16). As the SADF was advancing 
towards Cuito Cuanavale, the Angolan government pleaded with Cuba to send more troops as 
they had suffered losses during numerous previous encounters with the SADF, and the closest 
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Cuban unit was two hundred kilometers away. Cuba decided to send “a flood of units and 
combat equipment…across the Atlantic [which] disembarked on the southern coast of Angola 
in order to attack the enemy from the southwestern part of Angola, down towards Namibia” 
(Ankomah, 2008:16).  
 
In his interview in 2008 in New African, Castro states that he does not wish to elaborate any 
further on what exactly happened leading up to the last battle at Cuito Cuanavale, but simply 
states that Cuba’s brilliant commanders along with the reassembling Angolan army “prepared 
a mortal trap for the powerful South African forces…a trap into which the racist army fell, 
and was overpowered” (Ankomah, 2008:16). This statement is however, meant to be more 
metaphorical than substantial. As a result, Castro continues, this victory over the SADF as 
well as the Cuban advance towards southwestern Angola finally put an end to outside military 
aggression against Angola. The SADF had, as he puts it, “ to swallow its usual arrogant 
bullying and sit down at the negotiating table” (Ankomah, 2008:16).   
 
4.5) Resolution 435 and negotiations in 1988 
 
The year 1988 proved to be the breakthrough year for the US-brokered negotiations on the 
UN Resolution 435. This was due to the fact that, up until this time the participants had found 
it easier to simply increase military power than to make any political concessions. The ‘cosy 
little war’ in Angola now however became very dangerous as the size and intensity of the 
battles since late 1987 raised the stakes for all parties involved significantly.  The war had 
now become costly in terms of lives as well as material and Crocker envisaged success only if 
“all sides [were] able to claim a victory in order to sell an agreement to their respective 
constituencies” (Bender, 1989:25-26). In addition, Craig (2008) states that by 1988 casualties 
mounted and the “SADF’s inability to achieve decisive victories at battles such as Cuito 
Cuanavale” made negotiations all the more attractive (Baines & Vale, 2008:67). Therefore, at 
the start of 1988, negotiations seemed more attractive to all the parties as the MPLA and Cuba 
had suffered their largest military loss of the war in late 1987 during the failed attempt at the 
Lomba River in order to capture Mavinga, while Operation Packer and the defence of the 
Calueque dam were problematical to the SADF. 
 
The MPLA realized that a ‘final offensive’ against UNITA would be unsuccessful as long as 
the SADF committed its troops in aid of UNITA. For the MPLA a victory in either economic 
or political sphere was needed in order to restore the morale of their troops. Cuba too, wanted 
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a major victory before withdrawing its troops as its image in Angola had become tainted over 
the years. Bender (1989:26) states that Cuba “needed a major military victory in order to 
reclaim its position as the successful defender of African sovereignty against South African 
aggression”. South Africa however had decided to build on its success at Mavinga and 
attacked Cuito Cuanavale, which proved to be a fundamental error. Bender (1989:27) states 
that SA suffered huge losses in terms of troops and equipment during this abortive mission to 
capture the town, and when Defence Minister Magnus Malan received reports suggesting that 
taking the town would lead to the deaths of at least two hundred white soldiers, the mission 
was called off. According to Bender, SA was able to claim victory at Mavinga, but that it 
would be an illusion to think, “this battle signaled the possibility of a final military triumph”.  
 
At the negotiating table SA asserted that it would only withdraw from Angola once Russia 
and its proxies did the same” (Gleijeses, 2007). This was the American position as well. In 
March 1988 SA offered to withdraw into Namibia, not stating that it had any intention of 
surrendering the territory, if the Cuban forces withdrew from Angola. This was Chester 
Crocker’s “linkage”. In response the head of the Cuban delegation, Jorge Risquet, warned SA 
that “the time for [its] military adventures, for the acts of aggression that [they] had pursued 
with impunity, for [its] massacres of refugees is over” (Gleijeses, 2007). Cuba viewed SA’s 
actions not as being a victorious army, but as a defeated aggressor. This is the politics of 
perception (Gleijeses, 2007). 
 
In addition, in January 1988 – even before the siege at Cuito, two important events occurred 
which helped shape the outcome of the negotiations. Firstly, the SADF and UNITA attempts 
at driving the MPLA and Cuban forces out of the town of Cuito Cuanavale had failed several 
times. As Bender (1989) states, this turned out to be the Angolan government’s Stalingrad and 
a major military victory for the MPLA. This was the victory the government had been waiting 
for “in order to return to the negotiating table with renewed strength” (Bender, 1989:28). 
Secondly, a Cuban Politburo member Jorge Risquet, decided to join in at the negotiations in 
Luanda. This was significant as the Americans were wary of Cuban participation, as they 
feared they would obstruct any agreements that would be reached. Cuba however, participated 
in every negotiation sessions throughout 1988. They left Africa on the agreed date. 
 
Despite having gained considerable respect during 1988, Cuba could still not claim any major 
military victory since 1976 and participants in the negotiations started to wonder whether it 
“would be possible for Cuba to withdraw from Angola with its tarnished legacy” (Bender, 
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1989:29). Consequently, the Cuban build-up in southwestern Angola threatened to derail the 
negotiations as SA became anxious about its interests at the Calueque Dam being endangered. 
Shortly after the Cairo round of negotiations in June 1988, Cuban and Angolan forces 
attacked the Calueque Dam and killed twelve SADF members. Bender (1989:29) states that 
SA was not in a “position to match the Angolan and Cuban weaponry, [and] Pretoria thought 
it wise to retreat into Namibia”. This is when peace talks became a serious option. 
 
4.6) Claims, counter-claims and uncertain facts 
International observers speculated whether SA would retaliate the attack on the Calueque 
Dam and the USA believed that SA did indeed have the capacity to defeat the Cuban/Angolan 
forces along the Namibian border. Pretoria however, was not prepared to endure large losses 
among its troops and President P.W. Botha argued it would be wiser to defend the area from 
the Namibian side of the border than from the Angolan side. Even though this move was a big 
gamble on the side of the Cubans and Angolans, “South Africa was effectively checkmated 
across the border” (Bender, 1989:29).   
 
Magnus Malan (2006:3-1-302) claims however, that the earnestness, in which the 
negotiations between SA, Cuba, the MPLA and the USA took place in Cairo, had had a great 
impact on Cuba as it only wanted to negotiate about the phased withdrawal of its troops from 
Angola after the June 1988 attacks. At the following meeting in Genève a timeframe for 
withdrawal was agreed upon, which would be formally signed in New York on 22 December 
1988 by SA, Cuba and Angola. This agreement determined the schedule for Cuban troops’ 
withdrawal to the north as well as the number of Cuban troops that had to have left Angola by 
a certain date. 1 April 1989 would be the date when UN Resolution 435 had to be 
implemented and by 1 July 1989 all the occupying troops had to be out of Angola. 
 
On 1 April 1989 however, SWAPO forces crossed the border into Namibia breaking 
Resolution 435. A limited number of South African forces stationed in the region were asked 
to respond to this incident. After the incident signatories of the New York Accords were 
informed that SWAPO had neither been monitored correctly nor had it handed in all its 
weapons as had been agreed upon in the settlement. In addition PLAN forces did not enter 
Namibia through the points determined in Resolution 435 or the settlement and therefore was 
acting legitimately. The settlement was rectified and implemented once again on 19 May 
1989 (Malan, 2006:304). 
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During the negotiations that took place between SA, Cuba and the USA, Castro alleged that 
Chester Crocker had been opposed to Cuban participation in the negotiations for years. Castro 
continues by stating that Washington was now trying to eliminate Cuba’s involvement in 
Angola’s independence, Namibia’s independence as well as the defeat of the SADF by simply 
removing any evidence of Cuban involvement. In addition, he states that the USA was now 
also claiming that they had nothing to do with the war or the loss of thousands of Angolans 
lives during the war. In the interview Castro was asked whether he thinks that one of the main 
reasons that Cuba’s involvement in Africa was being overlooked due to the USA becoming 
Angola’s ally and one of Angola’s biggest oil purchasers. In response Castro acknowledges 
this fact and states, “the ridiculous Yankee attempts to ignore the honourable role that Cuba 
played is an indignity to the African nations. It’s due in part to the fact that the true history of 
those events has never been written” (Ankomah, 2008:17).  
 
According to Mills & Williams (2006), Castro argued that “the South Africans, by exploiting 
their big victory over the Angolans in October 1987, created a crisis and forced [him] to act, 
and that his intervention had significantly changed the correlation of forces” (Mills & 
Williams, 2006:185). Crocker (1992) also stated that Castro’s behavior during 1988 suggests 
that he had realized his country’s limits and that he could not dominate SA’s military. In 
addition, Heitman (1990), who had access to official SADF sources, stated that it was never 
the SADF’s intention to capture Cuito Cuanavale as the new the political repercussions it 
would cause if the SADF were to hold on to a town in Angola. Moreover, Bridgeland (1990) 
states that the Cuban assertion of the SADF over-extending themselves and then becoming 
surrounded in Cuito led to them entering negotiations is total nonsense. The terrain in 
southeastern Angola is so vast that it is impossible to become surrounded as the Cubans 
claim.  
 
SADF soldiers involved in the battle of Cuito Cuanavale agree that occupation of the town 
was neither a strategic nor tactical goal. They do however state that the only tactical reason 
for them to have taken the town “was to cut the Angolans brigades off that had retreated there 
and to then destroy them at leisure” (Mills & Williams, 2006:185). By the time the battle of 
Cuito Cuanavale took place SA already realized that they had to get out of Angola and 
Namibia. SA’s military position was worsening and the quick changing international “geo-
strategic landscape had persuaded the powers that be in Pretoria that the time was ripe for 
withdrawal” (Mills & Williams, 2006:185-186).  
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According to Von Clausewitz (cited by Scholtz, 1998:29) the more limited the goals of a war 
are, the more willing and able the leaders of both sides will become to make peace without the 
loss of too much prestige. There is however also a potential problem attached to limited goals. 
Von Clausewitz states that the greater the tension and violence within the war, the greater the 
chance of the war mirroring an absolute war. Thus, the more war-like the conflict becomes, 
the less political it appears to become. According to this view, it appears that in such cases 
governments tend to interfere with the military officers’ strategic, operational and tactical 
decisions, something that definitely happened during SA’s Angolan campaign from 1987 to 
1988. According to Bridgeland (1990) there seemed to have been disagreements between the 
political officials in Pretoria and the military leaders in the field about whether to attack 
FAPLA from the west or the east of the Cuito River. The SA Cabinet turned down the 
suggestion of attacking Cuito Cuanavale from behind and then controlling the road from 
Menogue as SA feared the possibility of international uproar if SADF troops were fighting 
deep in Angola after stating that it only had limited goals (Scholtz, 1998:32). 
 
Authors such as Fred Bridgeland, Steenkamp and Karl Maier were all war correspondents at 
the time of writing and therefore their accounts were written, one could say, as the different 
clashes unfolded. Steenkamp (1989) states that Operation Savannah was not, as many people 
thought at the time, a carefully planned military decision. At this time Prime Minister Vorster 
was heavily influenced by Lieutenant-General Hendrik van den Berg, Head of the Bureau for 
State Security, who tried to convince Vorster that deeper SADF involvement into Angola was 
not necessary. On the other end of the spectrum there was Defence Minister Botha, who was 
very supportive of a decision to deploy the SADF beyond the borders in order to contain the 
insurgency (Steenkamp, 1989:43). 
 
The writings of authors such as Chester Crocker, Leopold Scholtz and Dosman accounts all 
came after the war had already ended. They are deemed to be from a more neutral 
perspective. Scholtz (1998) states that the clashes in Angola between September 1987 and 
July 1988 were some of the most intense battles ever fought since the Second World War. 
The South African campaign in Angola against Angolan and Cuban forces, led to a series of 
initial victories for the SADF on the banks of the Lomba River. This campaign he admits 
however, later ended in stalemate at Cuito Cuanavale where the SADF allegedly lost and was 
forced to negotiate and withdraw from Angola.  Much have been written about the battle at 
Cuito Cuanavale in 1988, in the hopes of proving these statements wrong, even though South 
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Africa’s new National Defence Force tried to do this internally. By 1998, however, no such 
publication had yet been presented (Scholtz, 1998:17). 
 
Authors such as Horace Campbell, Davies & O’Meara and Fidel Castro all maintain that the 
SADF was defeated by Cuba. According to the more liberal authors such as Davies & 
O’Meara (1985), the South African government’s adoption of the “total strategy” toward the 
southern African region in 1977 was mobilized in order to ensure South Africa’s safety from 
nationalist movements’ infiltration.  As Vale (1991) concurs, for SA regional policy has 
always been an essential component of power within the region. These authors also state that 
this struggle, in which SA was engaged to assert its hegemony within the region, became even 
more intense during the 1980s. 
 
The 1987 campaign however, consisted of an entire brigade, which made it impossible to 
keep it a secret and as could have been suspected rumours of the SADF’s presence started to 
leak out. By November 1987 the news had leaked to British and American newspapers after 
which it appeared in the South African media as well. The South African Minister of Defence, 
Genl. Magnus Malan, had no other choice but to admit to the SADF’s presence in Angola. 
The media immediately began posing questions as to the nature of the SADF’s involvement 
as the lies of the failed SA campaign in 1975-’76 still haunted the country (Scholtz, 1998:33). 
 
In order to determine the winner in a war when the outcome is disputed, it is just as important 
to look at perceptions as the facts. Castro’s announcements on the war in Angola reached the 
international media first and therefore it became much easier for Cuba to claim victory over 
SA. Independent observers also played some role. One such observer was Karl Maier who 
visited the front at Menongue and Cuito Cuanavale on Castro’s invitation. He reported 
(1996), however, that the Cubans suffered many setbacks.  
 
SA on the other hand made no effort to invite independent journalists to their frontlines and as 
a result the SADF had already lost the war in terms of propaganda at a very early stage 
(Scholtz, 1998:53). By 1990, Bridgeman and Heitman had written, but that was two years 
after the events of 1988. According to Windrich (in Baines & Vale) it is impossible to state 
exactly who won the battle. Even though everybody claimed that they had won, all parties 
accepted to enter negotiations with their enemies who had not surrendered and therefore this 
was a war “without victors or vanquished” (Baines & Vale, 2008:205). Perhaps one could 
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argue that the SADF have merit in claiming that they had avenged their humiliating retreat of 
1975, as they imposed their power on Angola and Namibia for another decade. However, “SA 
had been out-fought and out-thought in the final stage of the war, but not wanting to admit 
failure, they claimed it publicly as a victory” (Baines & Vale, 2008:205). Perhaps an 
exaggeration. But by then, the Cold War was almost over. 
 
Maier (1996) states that the battle at Cuito Cuanavale “was a momentous [battle]… in which 
everyone claimed victory, but which, technically, no one really won” (Maier, 1996:32). 
According to him, the SADF got the better of the fighting, but lost the most psychologically. 
Cuito Cuanavale became the stuff of heroes as southern African armies consisting mostly of 
black soldiers “proved that the champions of apartheid were vulnerable” (Maier, 1996:32). 
Maier claims that resonance can be found among the numerous writers that praise the SADF’s 
performance in the fact that they all echo the military officers’ complaints of politicians 
preventing them from launching a full-scale attack on the Cubans and Angolans. These orders 
were given by the SA government in order to ensure white casualties in the border war were 
kept to an absolute minimum. For Castro, the battle of Cuito Cuanavale was to be his last 
chance “to shine as the defender of the downtrodden against the all-powerful imperialists” 
(Maier, 1996:32). Castro was able to bring his soldiers home with honour as SA agreed to pull 
out all its forces in Angola and grant Namibia its independence in 1990 providing the Cubans 
withdraw first. As the Cubans departed from Angola, so too did the pretext of a communist 
onslaught which the SA government had used as a shield against Western criticism for the 
longest time.  
 
The “battle” of Cuito Cuanavale had undoubtedly forced SA to look inward and had set in 
motion the inevitable process of reform. Maier claims that the MPLA government considered 
itself lucky to have survived the battle after being significantly defeated at the Lomba River. 
To some degree, Maier states that UNITA could also claim victory as it had been saved from 
total destruction. Cuito Cuanavale therefore proved to all the parties involved that the 
Angolan civil war could not be resolved on the battlefield. This battle helped set the stage for 
peace negotiations between UNITA and the MPLA, which came three years later “after stop-
go talks sponsored by the Portuguese, the USA and the USSR”. The Bicesse peace accords 
were signed on 31 May 1991 by President José Eduardo dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi in 
Portugal. This accord provided for a ceasefire, the demobilization of the two armies and 
general elections that were to be held in September 1992 (Maier, 1996:33). Savimbi and 
53 
 
UNITA lost the elections and resumed the war. In reality this war only ended 12 years later 
when UNITA’s Savimbi was assassinated in 2002. 
 
Shortly after the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, Fidel Castro claimed that Cuba’s decisive victory 
over the SADF was a watershed moment for Africa and that a new phase of the continent’s 
history had begun. This view is still maintained by many in SA and elsewhere today. 
According to Magnus Malan (2006) however, the SADF’s military victory was an 
unprecedented victory in military history up to that point. He states that the SADF’s troops 
never exceeded 3000 men and that they succeeded in crushing the Cuban/MPLA forces time 
after time with this limited number of troops. Scholtz (1998:50) however, argues that one has 
to look beyond this kind of propaganda and rather analyze the outcome from a military-
strategic and national-strategic point of view. This is why political outcomes are as 
important – if not more so, than military victories. 
 
The Soviet-Union and MPLA’s military-strategic goal was to defeat UNITA, while their 
operational goal was to occupy Mavinga and Jamba. Both these objectives failed. For Cuba, 
the military-strategic goal was to find space through which it could withdraw itself from the 
Angolan swamps. Their successful operational goal was to bluff the SADF with its march 
southwards and to intimidate them at the same time. Initially, the SADF’s military-strategic 
goal was to aid UNITA, while later this goal would be to ensure a peace agreement that would 
end Cuba’s presence in Angola and bring independence to Namibia. The SADF’s initial 
operational goal was to stop FAPLA’s advance to Mavinga and drive them back over the 
Cuito River so as to hinder a renewed offensive in 1988. The SADF succeeded in their 
strategic goals, while their operational objectives were only partially achieved as FAPLA 
managed to build a bridge at Tumpo just east from the Cuito River (Scholtz, 1998:51). 
 
Scholtz therefore concludes by stating that the Soviet-Union and FAPLA lost the war on 
military-strategic grounds, while the Cubans won. The SADF won in this regard against the 
Soviet-Union and the MPLA, while losing against Cuba. These losses and victories were not 
however achieved by means of a complete ‘knock-out’, but simply with, as Scholtz put it 
‘with points’. According to Scholtz’ national-strategic goals, the Soviet-Union, Cuba and the 
MPLA’s goal of establishing communism in Angola and Namibia failed miserably. South 
Africa’s on the other hand, was to prevent a SWAPO victory in Namibia, which also failed. 
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In an article in which Namibia’s founding president Sam Nujoma is interviewed, he thanks 
Cuba and Fidel Castro by saying “without [Cuban] support, we, in Namibia, would probably 
still be struggling to attain our freedom and independence, from under the yoke of the 
apartheid regime” (New African, 2008:26). When asked what the Cuban military victory 
meant for southern Africa, President Nujoma, as Castro, replied by saying that the “battle of 
Cuito Cuanavale was the last battle where apartheid South Africa was crushed” (New African, 
2008:27). Even though there were several battles between the SADF and the FAPLA/Cuban 
forces along the Lomba River, Cuito Cuanavale marked the climax of the war. However, to 
claim that the SADF were “comprehensively defeated, and their jetfighters were totally wiped 
out” (New African, 2008:27), is an exaggeration. 
 
Also after this defeat, according to then President Nujoma, the South Africans ‘ran away’ 
which led to the negotiations and eventually the signing of a ceasefire agreement and 
Namibia’s independence. Nujoma asserts “even in defeat the apartheid racists did not like to 
sit down with us at the same table [so] negotiations took place between us through the UN 
while we sat in different venues” (New African, 2008:28). This is also an exaggeration 
 
Looking back, scholars that belong to the “Defeat of SA” school, such as Campbell and Patel, 
SA’s intentions in Angola was purely self-motivated. Authors from this school of thought 
never visited the battlefront and based their findings purely on what transpired from Luanda. 
At the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, Horace Campbell believes that the Angolans were not only 
fighting to protect themselves from the racist SA Government, but also for the self-
determination of all Africans. Fidel Castro also maintains that this battle was a glorious 
victory for Cuba. Today we know this was not the case militarily, perhaps only politically. 
 
On the contrary, the writings by military correspondents such as Bridgeland and Heitman and 
the American diplomat, Chester Crocker are similar to the versions of South African military 
leaders such as Geldenhuys, Jan Breytenbach and Malan. According to these authors SA’s 
main objective was to stop the MPLA from coming to power in Angola. The story of Cuito 
Cuanavale therefore has so many different and contradictory versions that finding the truth 
from a myriad of sources is very difficult. One of the most important questions is also 
whether one can typify the battle of Cuito Cuanavale as a battle in which one party won and 
another lost, seeing as there was no party to the conflict that surrendered to another. Perhaps 
this was a siege, but one with huge political outcomes, not only for Namibia and Angola, but 
South Africa as well. 
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Chapter 5 
 
5) Conclusion 
 
This study is about the “what” and the “why” of South African intervention in Angola during 
the 1970s and the 1980s. This is the usual sequence of addressing research questions. In this 
study, however, it might be better to attend to the “why” before the “what”, as it might 
explain the controversies better. Williams (2008:125-6) explains that this “Border War” was 
never declared, that the SADF never wanted to capture territory, but it was always unpopular, 
fought largely in secret. 
 
For the researcher this war in Angola creates special problems. Because it was a “secret” war, 
South African media could not cover news events. Once books became available after 1990, 
they were written in Afrikaans or English and seldom published abroad. They therefore did 
not always influence public opinion. The Cubans published on their 1975 and 1988 
campaigns, but mostly in Spanish. 
 
South African researchers only learned later that Operation Savannah was opposed by 
Operation Carlota, at the time of the 1975/6 war for Luanda. The same happened 13 years 
later when Operations Hooper and Packer were opposed by Operation Anniversary XXXI. In 
both cases the Cuban side was trumpeted by the Angolans while the South African side 
received a sceptic audience. 
 
The outcome is still shielded in controversies – this is the “why” of this study; while “what” is 
less controversial because it is more descriptive. 
 
5.1) Why the controversies? 
 
According to Guimareas (1988) the outcome of the war could have been very different had 
SA decided not to send in its army. SA’s main political objective was to deny the MPLA from 
coming to power in Angola, an objective they failed to achieve. In 1975 SA did not have a 
cohesive policy towards Angola and as a result the implications of the first intervention were 
not suitably defined. Maintaining white superiority in SA was Pretoria’s biggest foreign 
policy priority and therefore the “defence of SA was inextricably linked to [the] domestic 
policies of maintaining white power” (Guimareas, 1988:122).  
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In choosing to support UNITA, it provided SA with a buffer between Namibia and the 
possibility of any hostile government that might emerge in Angola. In addition, when the 
USA also decided to side with UNITA in 1975/76, SA also came into line with the USA’s 
Angolan policy. This dramatically improved SA’s international political stance after years of 
being shunned by the West due to the policy of apartheid (Guimareas, 1988:132). External 
actors also played very important roles in the shaping of the conflict and there are several 
reasons that could explain the multitude of external actors becoming involved. Zaïre saw its 
involvement as an opportunity to emerge more powerfully in the region, as it linked FNLA’s 
interested with those of the USA. SA believed that if it shared the USA’s anti-communist 
objectives, the USA would align its interests with SA as well. SA’s intervention, thus, was a 
clear result of the “interplay between its perceived strategic objectives and domestic policies” 
(Guimareas, 1988:199).  
 
This took place at the height of the Cold War, implying foreign intervention other than South 
Africa’s. For Cuba, intervention came as a result of both internal political and ideological 
concerns. Cuba had a long-standing relationship with the MPLA and this gave Cuba the 
opportunity to intervene and reinforce its internationalist posture and credibility. For the USA 
and the Soviet Union, intervention was the product of their global rivalry, and not the result of 
particular interest in Angola. Both these superpowers’ interventions “resulted in part from the 
perception that it was important to the other” (Guimareas, 1988:199).  
 
This led to “the accumulation of a number of layers of conflict on the foundations of the 
internal struggle for power” (Guimareas, 1988:199).  
 
One of the questions this study tried to answer was what were Cuba, the Soviet Union and 
even the USA’s actual motives to support the nationalist movements (in the American case, 
first the FNLA and then Unita) and why the attitudes changed toward support for these 
movements as the conflict continued. 
 
Gleijeses (2007) argues that Cuba played a fundamental role in changing the course of 
southern African history. Many authors, including Magnus Malan, according to Gleijeses 
have tried to rewrite the history of this battle but he maintains that US and Cuban documents 
tell a different story to that of South African records. He continues by stating that the Cubans’ 
“battlefield prowess and negotiating skills were instrumental in forcing South Africa to accept 
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Namibia’s independence. Their successful defence of Cuito was the prelude for a campaign 
that forced the SADF out of Angola. This victory reverberated beyond Namibia” (Gleijeses, 
2007). Whether this victorious defence was an SADF defeat is another question altogether. 
 
5.2) The “what” of the outcome 
 
Horace Campbell (1990) is a leading academic in the “South African defeat” school of 
thought. He stated that SA wanted to sustain its national army even though the country was 
not democratic; the black population were opposed to the state and the fact that the real cause 
for SA’s involvement in Angola was not the threat of communism, but the threat to white 
power. SA faced the inevitable in 1988, as the country could no longer sustain or support its 
army from the narrow white population. By entering negotiations Campbell claims, SA hoped 
to salvage the humiliation they had faced at Cuito Cuanavale.  
 
The opposite view is that the SADF had not lost. According to Heitman “the South Africans 
managed to bring about a total change in both the strategic and political situation in south-
eastern Africa by the carefully controlled application of limited force. Operation Modular and 
the ensuing campaign are an excellent illustration of “war as an instrument of politics: the 
deployment of a small force operating under very close political control achieved the political 
end that had eluded the diplomats for years” (Heitman, 1990:347). Magnus Malan (2006) 
states that the Cuban and MPLA withdrawal from the Cuito River was accelerated by the 
SADF’s successful battles on 9, 11, 13 and 17 November 1987. This according to him proved 
to be the war’s turning point as the heavy Cuban/FAPLA losses during these battles reduced 
the enemy’s appetite for conflict (other authors claimed that Cubans were not involved in 
1987, only since February 1988). On 13 and 14 January and 25 February 1988 the war 
reached its final phase as the SADF/UNITA forces succeeded in driving the Cuban/FAPLA 
forces over the Cuito River as they failed to reach Mavinga on the way to Jamba. There was 
however, still a limited FAPLA presence on the river’s eastern banks but on 23 March 1988 
the last fight took place at Tumpo.  
 
Malan claims that during these operations FAPLA launched a big propaganda campaign to 
make them appear to be the ‘good guys’ to the world by means of false information. FAPLA 
alleged at times that the SADF had deployed more than three thousand troops simultaneously 
in Angola or that the SADF had lost forty airplanes during some of their clashes with FAPLA. 
Moreover, Malan states that this propaganda tried to convince the world that one of the 
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SADF’s main goals was to capture Cuito Cuanavale, but that this attempt had failed. Malan 
does not concede this point. But many others make the point that Cuba had launched 
Operation XXXI Anniversary bolstering the Cuban/FAPLA defences which also kept supply 
lines from Menongue open to its troops. On the day of the attack foul weather also 
handicapped the South Africans, and by 16:00 the “battle for Africa” stopped. Thereafter 
about all the parties to the conflict opted for peace, but not before the Cubans moved into the 
southwest as well. 
 
Breytenbach (1997) considers the clash that took place at Cuito Cuanavale to be a siege rather 
than a battle seeing as it was the last instalment of a FAPLA campaigns launched in the hopes 
of capturing Mavinga and Jamba. If FAPLA succeeded in capturing Mavinga air attacks could 
have been launched on UNITA’s headquarters at Jamba. This however, never happened as the 
SADF aided UNITA in forcing the FAPLA forces to retreat to Cuito Cuanavale. The fact that 
the SADF/UNITA alliance won the battle for Jamba, at Mavinga, is one on which there exists 
consensus among scholars. By this time the Cubans had increased their troops to fifty 
thousand men in the hopes of ‘out-escalating’ the South Africans who were suffering under 
sever Western sanctions.  
 
After another seven months of chronic warfare between the SADF and FAPLA/Cuban forces, 
both parties had realized the very high cost they would have to pay for victory. Both parties 
faced a mutual hurting stalemate and the chances of a negotiated settlement increased. As the 
Cubans were marching to the Namibian border in the southwest, negotiations became 
inevitable as the USA pursued the linkage of Cuban troop withdrawal with that of a peace 
process. For Chester Crocker – Ronald Reagan’s minister for Africa, this was a success story 
because the “linkage policy” always aimed at Namibian independence, but Cuban withdrawal 
as well. There are many different ways in which one can analyze what exactly it was that led 
to parties agreeing on sitting down at the negotiating table. On the one hand the USA’s policy 
of linkage or ‘constructive engagement’ can be seen as the deciding factor in the prelude to 
negotiations. 
 
Another aim of this study was to distinguish between the short-term military outcomes (eg the 
battle, siege, loss of equipment and casualties etc) and the longer-term political consequences 
for every party to the conflict.  
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5.2.1) Short-term military outcomes 
 
The short-term military outcomes, according to Breytenbach (1997), were the fact that the 
SADF had withdrawn from Angola as well as from its alliance with UNITA. According to the 
peace agreement, the Angolans also had to pressurize the ANC to shut down all its camps in 
Angola. After the Cuban withdrawal from Angola, Namibia finally became independent. With 
the implementation of the peace accords and Resolution 435 and after all the foreign troops 
had withdrawn from Angola, the “conventional war between the two opposing (Angolan) 
alliances quickly degenerated into a civil war between the MPLA and UNITA”  
(Breytenbach, 1997:60). After more than a decade of war, it seemed as if Angola was back to 
where it was in 1975. Peace, however, did come after Savimbi’s death in 2002. 
 
Other short-term military outcome at that time was that although the Cuban/FAPLA alliance 
succeeding in defending Cuito in March 1988, the FAPLA component had lost shortly before 
against the UNITA/South African alliance at the Lomba River. It was this defeat that 
prompted the Angolan president to personally request Cuba’s assistance with Fidel Castro in 
December 1987. 
 
These short-term military outcomes had now come to an end with the signing of the peace 
agreements in 1988, while the longer-term consequences for Angola as well as the rest of the 
parties involved now became apparent. As Scholtz (1998) also state, for SWAPO the end of 
the war led to victory through multi-party elections in Namibia, the Soviet Union collapsed 
and South Africa was given the opportunity to face its internal problems. The negotiations 
also offered Angola the chance to settle their civil war without any interference from outside 
forces. This goal however, still eluded Angola well into the 1990s. Thus, defining a clear 
winner and loser to the Angolan conflict is very problematic as one can view both Namibia 
(in terms of independence gained) as well as the USA (in terms of winning the Cold War) as 
winners. Williams (2008:125) rightly asks that if Cuba won, why did they call a halt? 
 
5.2.2) The longer-term consequences 
 
Likewise, one could view the ‘old’ South Africa as a loser in the political sense. According to 
Pacheco (1989) it is important for any outside observer to understand that South Africa’s total 
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national strategy was not envisaged by the South African government as simply a safeguard 
against anti-apartheid forces. The upholding of apartheid was therefore not, according to 
Pacheco, the primary motivation for the government to increase security measures along its 
borders. First and foremost, the South African government viewed itself as being “in a 
struggle against a determined Marxist opponent” (Pacheco, 1989:70). In such a case, where a 
states’ survival is deemed the primary objective, what it then perceives as being a hostile and 
reckless world and the way in which they perceive this threat becomes less important.  
 
In Baines & Vale (2008) several authors discuss the fact that future analyses on the Angolan 
conflict need to bear in mind that “access to previously closed archives is necessary in order 
to [analyze and fill in the gaps] in the diplomatic and military history of southern Africa” 
(Baines & Vale, 2008:9). One of these authors, Elaine Windrich, asserts that as UNITA 
became increasingly dependent on the SADF it virtually sacrificed its own autonomy. UNITA 
only served as a mechanism that would minimize the loss of more white conscripts for the 
SADF. After Cuba committed more troops to aid the Angolans, the SADF suffered more and 
more white casualties and therefore might have decided to withdraw from Angola and 
Namibia. There was this perception that South Africa had lost air superiority when the 
Cubans re-entered in 1988. 
 
In addition, former SADF generals still maintain that they were under pressure from the 
Department of Foreign Affairs “to allow the Cubans to find a face-saving way of withdrawing 
from the conflict” (Baines & Vale, 2008:9). General Jannie Geldenhuys and General Magnus 
Malan especially maintain these assertions. Edgar Dosman (in Baines & Vale, 2008) on the 
other hand, gives the SADF credit on the battlefield but also recognizes its failings. Access to 
Cuban sources enabled him to reveal how Cuba planned and exercised its military operations. 
Contrary to belief, Dosman does not portray the MPLA and FAPLA as Cuban proxies, but 
instead examines some of the tensions that existed between the Cubans, the Angolans as well 
as the Russians (Baines & Vale, 2008:9). 
 
Writing about Soviet soldiers in the Angolan war, Shubin (2007, as reviewed by Ian 
Liebenberg) referred to Russian assessments of South African tactics. According to them, 
South Africa relied too heavily on artillery and rocket launchers, while neglecting the role of 
infantry and the air force. However, what we know today is that South Africa was always 
reluctant to use better trained white infantry soldiers and preferred black UNITA fighters 
instead. White casualties had to be kept at a minimum. The point made about the use of the air 
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force is understandable in terms of the arms sanctions against South Africa which meant that 
SA Airforce planes were becoming older and even obsolete. In light of these arguments, the 
SADF actually did well militarily during the Angolan war.  
 
Steenkamp (1989) poses three very important questions regarding SA’s involvement in the 
Angolan conflict. Firstly, he asks whether SA should have fought the insurgents threatening 
their borders. He states that once SA realized this conflict was not going to be resolved 
quickly they probably had no other choice. The SA public would have resented the 
government had no action been taken and after the failed 1976 intervention their fate was 
sealed. Secondly, he asks whether the war could have ended sooner than it eventually did. He 
argues that the war definitely could have ended much sooner and that the reason it dragged on 
was not, as is commonly believed, because the South Africans deliberately stonewalled the 
peace talks.  
 
On the one hand he admits that SA was indeed inflexible at times, resisting to yield to 
compromises. On the other hand however, SWAPO was also guilty of stubbornness as it 
stonewalled the peace talks twice before the end of the war (Steenkamp, 1989:186). Thirdly, 
and most importantly, Steenkamp poses the question of who the actual winners were. 
According to him, the SADF won the armed struggle. At the time this source was written it 
was still unsure what the outcome of the general election in Namibia would be. The author 
however, stated that if the new Namibian government turned out to be neutral towards SA 
“the South Africans will have achieved their minimum political requirement as well” 
(Steenkamp, 1989:187). 
 
In the end the year 1988 turned out to be a good one for Cuba – at least politically. The post-
1988 era also turned out positively for Namibia, and for SWAPO that won the elections after 
being pinned down for so long in northern Namibia by the SADF. The other winners are the 
Americans who succeeded in forcing the Cubans out of Africa, whereafter US companies 
benefitted handsomely from oil exploration in Angola.  
 
The biggest losers were UNITA who were abandoned internationally after 1988. This 
outcome, according to Scholtz might have been the best possible result for everyone. It 
certainly aided in preparing SA both intellectually and emotionally for the negotiations with 
the ANC that was to follow (Scholtz, 1998:52). 
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